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Abstract
We extend the 0-approximation of sensing actions and incomplete information in (Son and Baral 2001)
to action theories with static causal laws and prove its soundness with respect to the possible world
semantics. We also show that the conditional planning problem with respect to this approximation is
NP-complete. We then present an answer set programming based conditional planner, called ASCP,
that is capable of generating both conformant plans and conditional plans in the presence of sensing
actions, incomplete information about the initial state, and static causal laws. We prove the cor-
rectness of our implementation and argue that our planner is sound and complete with respect to the
proposed approximation. Finally, we present experimental results comparing ASCP to other planners.
KEYWORDS: Reasoning about Actions and Changes, Sensing Actions, Incomplete Information,
Conformant Planning, Conditional Planning, Answer Set Programming
1 Introduction
Classical planning assumes that agents have complete information about the world. For this
reason, it is often labeled as unrealistic because agents operating in real-world environment
often do not have complete information about their environment. Two important questions
arise when one wants to remove this assumption: how to reason about the knowledge of
agents and what is a plan in the presence of incomplete information. The first question
led to the development of several approaches to reasoning about effects of sensing (or
knowledge producing) actions (Golden and Weld 1996b; Lobo et al. 1997; Moore 1985;
Scherl and Levesque 2003; Son and Baral 2001; Thielscher 2000b). The second question
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led to the notions of conditional plan and conformant plan whose execution is guaranteed
to achieve the goal regardless of the values of unknown fluents in the initial situation. The
former contains sensing actions and conditionals such as the well-known “if-then-else” or
“cases” construct, while the latter is just a sequence of actions. In this paper, we refer to
conditional planning and conformant planning as planning approaches that generate con-
ditional plans and conformant plans, respectively. We use plan as a generic term for both
conditional and conformant plan when the distinction between the two is not important.
Approaches to conditional planning can be characterized by the techniques employed
in their search process or by the action formalism that supports their reasoning process.
Most of the early conditional planners implemented a partial-order planning algorithm
(Golden 1998; Golden et al. 1996a; Pryor and Collins 1996; Peot and Smith 1992) and used
Situation Calculus or STRIPS as their underlying formalism in representing and reason-
ing about actions and their effects. Among them, CoPlaS (Lobo 1998), which is imple-
mented in Sicstus Prolog, is a regression planner that uses a high-level action description
language to represent and reason about effects of actions, including sensing actions; and
FLUX (Thielscher 2000a), a constraint logic programming based planner, is capable of
generating and verifying conditional plans. Another conditional planner based on a QBF
theorem prover was developed in (Rintanen 2000). Some other planners, for example, SGP
(Weld et al. 1998) or POND (Bryce et al. 2004), extended the planning graph algorithm
(Blum and Furst 95) to deal with sensing actions. The main difference between SGP and
POND is that the former searches solutions within the planning graph, whereas the latter
uses it as a means of computing the heuristic function.
Conformant planning (Bonet and Geffner 2000; Brafman and Hoffmann 2004; Cimatti et al. 2004;
Castellini et al. 2003; Eiter et al. 2003; Smith and Weld 1998) is another approach to deal
with incomplete information. In conformant setting, a solution is simply a sequence of ac-
tions that achieves the goal from every possible initial situation. A recent study (Cimatti et al. 2004)
shows that conformant planning based on model checking is computationally competitive
with other approaches to conformant planning such as those based on heuristic search
algorithms (Bonet and Geffner 2000; Brafman and Hoffmann 2004) or those that extend
Graphplan (Smith and Weld 1998). A detailed comparison in (Eiter et al. 2003) demon-
strates that a logic programming based conformant planner is able to compete with other
approaches to planning.
The most important difference between conditional planners and conformant planners
lies in the fact that conditional planners can deal with sensing actions whereas confor-
mant planners cannot. Consequently, there are planning problems solvable by conditional
planners but not by conformant planners. The following example demonstrates this issue.
Example 1
Consider a security window with a lock that behaves as follows. The window can be in
one of the three states opened, closed1 or locked2. When the window is closed or opened,
pushing it up or down will open or close it respectively. When the window is closed or
locked, flipping the lock will lock or close it respectively.
1 The window is closed and unlocked.
2 The window is closed and locked.
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Now, consider a security robot that needs to make sure that the window is locked after
9 pm. Suppose that the robot has been told that the window is not open (but whether it is
locked or closed is unknown).
Intuitively, the robot can achieve its goal by performing the following steps. First, (1) it
checks the window to determine the window’s status. If the window is closed, (2.a) it locks
the window; otherwise (i.e., the window is already locked), simply (2.b) it does nothing.
Observe that no sequence of actions can achieve the goal from every possible initial
situation. In other words, there exists no conformant plan achieving the goal. ✷
In this paper, we investigate the application of answer set programming (see e.g. (Baral 2003;
Lifschitz 2002; Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1999; Niemela¨ 1999)) in conformant and condi-
tional planning. To achieve our goal, we first define an approximation semantic for ac-
tion theories with static causal laws and sensing actions based on the 0-approximation
in (Son and Baral 2001). It is an alternative to the possible world semantics for reason-
ing about effects of actions in the presence of incomplete information and sensing actions
(Moore 1985). The basic idea of this approach is to approximate the set of possible world
states by a set of fluent literals that is true in every possible world state. The main advantage
of the approximation-based approach is its low complexity in reasoning and planning tasks
(NP-complete) comparing to those based on the possible world semantics Σ2P-complete
(Baral et al. 2000a). The trade-off for this low complexity is incompleteness. As we will
demonstrate in our experiments, this is not really an issue with the benchmarks in the lit-
erature.
We prove that the entailment relationship for action theories based on this approxima-
tion is sound with respect to the possible world semantics for action theories with incom-
plete initial situation. We then show that the planning problem with respect to the newly
developed approximation is NP-complete. This facilitates the development of ASCP, an
answer set programming based planner that is capable of generating both conditional and
conformant plans. Given a planning problem instance with incomplete information about
the initial situation and sensing actions, we translate it into a logic program whose an-
swer sets (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) – which can be computed using existing answer set
solvers (e.g. cmodels (Lierler and Maratea 2004), smodels (Simons et al. 2002), dlv
(Citrigno et al. 1997), ASSAT (Lin and Zhao 2002), NoMore (Anger, et al. 2002), etc.) –
correspond to conformant or conditional plans that satisfy the goal. We compare our plan-
ner against state-of-the-art planners. The results of our experiments show that conditional
and conformant planning based on answer set programming can be competitive with other
approaches. To the best of our knowledge, no answer set based conditional planner has
been developed except a previous version of the planner presented in an earlier version of
this paper (Son et al. 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basics of an action language
with sensing actions and static causal laws, including its syntax and the 0-approximation,
as well as the notions of conditional plans and queries. It also contains the complexity
result of the conditional planning problem with respect to the 0-approximation. Section 3
describes a logic programming encoding of a conditional/conformant planner, called ASCP.
Section 4 discusses several properties of ASCP. Section 5 experimentally compares ASCP
with some other state-of-the-art conformant/conditional planners. Section 6 discusses some
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desirable extensions of the current work. The proofs of theorems and propositions are given
in Appendices A and B. An example of encoding is given in Appendix C.
2 AcK — An Action Language with Sensing Actions and Static Causal Laws
The representation language, AcK , for our planner is an extension of the action language
AK in (Son and Baral 2001). WhileAK extends the high-level action description language
A from (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1993) by introducing two new types of propositions called
knowledge producing proposition and the executability condition, AcK extends AK by
adding static causal laws and allowing a sensing action to sense more than one fluent.
Loosely speaking, AcK is a subset of the language LDS in (Baral et al. 2000b). Neverthe-
less, like AK , LDS considers sensing actions that sense only one fluent. The semantics
given for AcK in this paper is an approximation of the semantics of LDS .
2.1 Action Language AcK – Syntax
The alphabet of an action theory in AcK consists of a set of actions A and a set of fluents
F. A fluent literal (or literal for short) is either a fluent f ∈ F or its negation ¬f . f and
¬f are said to be complementary. For a literal l, by ¬l, we mean its complement. A fluent
formula is a propositional formula constructed from the set of literals using operators ∧,
∨, and/or ¬. To describe an action theory, propositions of the following forms are used:
initially(l) (1)
executable(a, ψ) (2)
causes(a, l, φ) (3)
if(l, ϕ) (4)
determines(a, θ) (5)
where a ∈ A is an action, l is a literal, and ψ, φ, ϕ, θ are sets of literals3.
The initial situation is described by a set of propositions (1), called v-propositions. (1)
says that l holds in the initial situation. A proposition of form (2) is called executability con-
dition. It says that a is executable in any situation in which ψ holds (the precise meaning of
hold will be given later). A proposition (3), called a dynamic causal law, represents a con-
ditional effect of an action. It says that performing a in a situation in which φ holds causes
l to hold in the successor situation. A proposition (4), called a static causal law, states that
l holds in any situation in which ϕ holds. A knowledge proposition (or k-proposition for
short) (5) states that the values of literals in θ, sometimes referred to as sensed-literals, will
be known after a is executed. Because the execution of a will determine the truth value of
at least one fluent, without loss of generality, we assume that θ contains at least two liter-
als. Furthermore, we require that if θ is not a set of two contrary literals f and ¬f then the
literals in θ are mutually exclusive, i.e.,
3 A set of literals is interpreted as the conjunction of its members. The empty set ∅ denotes true.
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1. for every pair of literals g and g′ in θ, g 6= g′, the theory contains the static causal
law
if(¬g′, {g})
and
2. for every literal g in θ, the theory contains the static causal law
if(g, {¬g′ | g′ ∈ θ \ {g}}).
For convenience, we use the abbreviation
oneof(θ)
to denote the above set of static causal laws. Apart from this, we will sometime write
determines(a, f)
to stand for
determines(a, {f,¬f}).
Actions appearing in (3) and (5) are called non-sensing actions and sensing actions,
respectively. In this paper, we assume that they are disjoint from each other. In addition,
we also assume that each sensing action appears in at most one k-proposition.
An action theory is given by a pair (D, I) whereD is a set of propositions (2)–(5) and I
is a set of propositions (1). D and I are called the domain description and initial situation,
respectively. A planning problem instance is a 3-tuple (D, I,G), where (D, I) is an action
theory and G is a conjunction of fluent literals. It is worth mentioning that with a proper
set of rules for checking the truth value of a fluent formula (see e.g. (Son et al. 2005a)),
the framework and all results presented in this paper can be extended to allow G to be an
arbitrary fluent formula as well.
Example 2
The planning problem instance P1 = (D1, I1,G1) in Example 1 can be represented as
follows.
D1 =


executable(check, {})
executable(push up, {closed})
executable(push down, {open})
executable(flip lock, {¬open})
causes(push down, closed, {})
causes(push up, open, {})
causes(flip lock, locked, {closed})
causes(flip lock, closed, {locked})
oneof({open, locked, closed})
determines(check, {open, closed, locked})


I1 =
{
initially(¬open)
}
G1 = {locked}
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✷
Remark 1
For an action theory (D, I), if(l, ∅) ∈ D implies that literal l holds in every situation. Since
l is always true, queries about the truth value of l (or¬l) have a trivial answer and the theory
can be simplified by removing all instances of l in other propositions. Furthermore, if the
theory also contains a dynamic law of the form causes(a,¬l, φ) then the execution of a in
a state satisfying φ will result in an inconsistent state of the world. Thus, the introduction
of l in the action theory is either redundant or erroneous. For this reason, without loss of
generality, we will assume that action theories in this paper do not contain any static causal
law (4) with ϕ = ∅.
Remark 2
Since an empty plan can always be used to achieve an empty goal, we will assume hereafter
that planning problem instances considered in this paper have non-empty goals.
2.2 Conditional Plan
In the presence of incomplete information and sensing actions, we need to extend the
notion of a plan from a sequence of actions so as to allow conditional statements such
as if-then-else, while-do, or case-endcase (see e.g. (Levesque 1996; Lobo et al. 1997;
Son and Baral 2001)). Notice that an if-then-else statement can be replaced by a case-
endcase statement. Besides, if we are only interested in plans with bounded length then
whatever can be represented by a while-do statement with a non-empty body can also be
represented by a set of case-endcase statements as well. Therefore, in this paper, we limit
ourselves to conditional plans with the case-endcase construct only. Formally, we con-
sider conditional plans defined as follows. We note that our notion of conditional plans
in this paper is fairly similar to the ones introduced in (Levesque 1996; Lobo et al. 1997;
Son and Baral 2001).
Definition 1 (Conditional Plan)
1. [] is a conditional plan, denoting the empty plan, i.e., the plan containing no action.
2. if a is a non-sensing action and p is a conditional plan then [a; p] is a conditional
plan.
3. if a is a sensing action with proposition (5), where θ = {g1, . . . , gn}, and pj’s are
conditional plans then [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)] is a conditional plan.
4. Nothing else is a conditional plan.
By this definition, clearly a sequence of actions is also a conditional plan. The execution
of a conditional plan of the form [a; p], where a is a non-sensing action and p is another
conditional plan, is done sequentially, i.e., a is executed first, followed by p. To execute
a conditional plan of the form [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], we first execute a and then
evaluate each gj with respect to our current knowledge. If one of the gj’s, say gk, holds,
we execute the corresponding sub-plan pk. Observe that because fluent literals in θ are
mutual exclusive, such gk uniquely exists.
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Example 3
The following are conditional plans of the action theory in Example 2:
p1 = [push down; flip lock]
p2 = check; cases

 open → []closed → [flip lock]
locked → []


p3 = check; cases

 open → [push down; flip lock]closed → [flip lock; flip lock; flip lock]
locked → []


p4 = check; cases

 open → []closed → p2
locked → []


Among those, p2, p3 and p4 are conditional plans that achieve the goal G14. ✷
In the rest of the paper, the terms “plan” and “conditional plan” will be used alternatively.
2.3 Queries
A query posed to an AcK action theory (D, I) is of the form
knows ρ after p (6)
or
whether ρ after p (7)
where p is a conditional plan and ρ is a fluent formula. Intuitively, the first (resp. second)
query asks whether ρ is true (resp. known) after the execution of p from the initial situation.
2.4 0-Approximation Semantics of AcK
We now define an approximation semantics ofAcK , called 0-approximation, which extends
the 0-approximation in (Son and Baral 2001) to deal with static causal laws. It is defined
by a transition function Φ that maps actions and a-states into sets of a-states (the meaning
of a-states will follow). Before providing the formal definition of the transition function,
we introduce some notations and terminology.
For a set of literals σ, ¬σ denotes the set {¬l | l ∈ σ}. σ is said to be consistent if it
does not contain two complementary literals. A literal l (resp. set of literals γ) holds in a
set of literals σ if l ∈ σ (resp. γ ⊆ σ); l (resp. γ) possibly holds in σ if ¬l 6∈ σ (resp.
¬γ ∩ σ = ∅).
Given a consistent set of literals σ, the truth value of a formula ρ, denoted by σ(ρ), is
defined as follows. If ρ ≡ l for some literal l then σ(ρ) = T if l ∈ σ; σ(ρ) = F if ¬l ∈ σ;
σ(ρ) = unknown otherwise. If ρ ≡ ρ1 ∧ ρ2 then σ(ρ) = T if σ(ρ1) = T and σ(ρ2) = T;
4 Note that p2 and p4 can achieve the goal because the first case “the window is open” cannot happen
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σ(ρ) = F if σ(ρ1) = F or σ(ρ2) = F; σ(ρ) = unknown otherwise. If ρ ≡ ρ1 ∨ ρ2
then σ(ρ) = T if σ(ρ1) = T or σ(ρ2) = T; σ(ρ) = F if σ(ρ1) = F and σ(ρ2) = F;
σ(ρ) = unknown otherwise. If ρ ≡ ¬ρ1 then σ(ρ) = T if σ(ρ1) = F; σ(ρ) = F if
σ(ρ1) = T; σ(ρ) = unknown otherwise.
We say that ρ is known to be true (resp. false) in σ and write σ |= ρ (resp. σ |= ¬ρ)
if σ(ρ) = T (resp. σ(ρ) = F). When σ |= ρ or σ |= ¬ρ we say that ρ is known in σ;
otherwise, ρ is unknown in σ. We will say that ρ holds in σ if it is known to be true in σ.
A set of literals σ satisfies a static causal law (4) if either (i) ϕ does not hold in σ; or
(ii) l holds in σ (i.e., ϕ holds in σ implies that l holds in σ). By ClD(σ), we denote the
smallest set of literals that includes σ and satisfies all static causal laws in D. Note that
ClD(σ) might be inconsistent but it is unique (see Lemma 1, Appendix A).
An interpretation I of a domain descriptionD is a complete and consistent set of literals
in D, i.e., for every fluent f ∈ F, (i) f ∈ I or ¬f ∈ I; and (ii) {f,¬f} 6⊆ I .
A state s is an interpretation satisfying all static causal laws in D. An action a is ex-
ecutable in s if there exists an executability condition (2) such that ψ holds in s. For a
non-sensing action a executable in s, let
E(a, s) = {l | ∃ a dynamic causal law (3) such that φ holds in s} (8)
The set E(a, s) is often referred to as the direct effects of a. When the agent has complete
information about the world, the set of possible next states after the execution of a in s,
denoted by RescD(a, s), is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Possible Next States, (McCain and Turner 1995))
Let D be a domain description. For any state s and non-sensing action a executable in s,
RescD(a, s) = {s
′ | s′ is a state such that s′ = ClD(E(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s′))}.
The intuitive meaning of this definition is that a literal l holds in a possible next state s′
of s after a is executed iff either (i) it is a direct effect of a, i.e., l ∈ E(a, s) (ii) it holds
by inertia, i.e., l ∈ (s ∩ s′), or (iii) it is an indirect effect5 of a, i.e., l holds because of the
operator ClD .
Note that the RescD-function can be non-deterministic, i.e., RescD(a, s) might contain
more than one element. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 4
Consider the following domain description
D2 =


executable(a, {})
causes(a, f, {})
if(g, {f,¬h})
if(h, {f,¬g})
if(k, {¬f})


Let s = {¬f,¬g,¬h, k}. Clearly s is a state since it satisfies all static laws in D2. Execut-
ing a in s results in two possible next states
RescD2(a, s) = {{f,¬g, h, k}, {f, g,¬h, k}}
5 Indirect effects are those caused by static causal laws.
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In the first possible next state s1 = {f,¬g, h, k}, f holds because it is a direct effect of
a, i.e., f ∈ E(a, s); ¬g and k hold because of inertia (s ∩ s1 = {¬g, k}); and h holds
because it is an indirect effect of a (in particular, h holds because of the static causal law
if(h, {f,¬g})).
Likewise, we can explain why each literal in the second possible next state holds. ✷
Definition 3 (Consistent Domains)
A domain description D is consistent if for every state s and action a executable in s,
RescD(a, s) 6= ∅.
In the presence of incomplete information, an agent, however, does not always know ex-
actly which state it is currently in. One possible way to deal with this problem is to repre-
sent the agent knowledge by a set of possible states (a.k.a. belief state) that are consistent
with the agent’s current knowledge and extend Definition 2 to define a mapping from pairs
of actions and belief states into belief states as in (Baral et al. 2000b). The main problem
with this approach is its high complexity (Baral et al. 2000a), even for the computation of
what is true/false after the execution of one action. We address this problem by defining an
approximation of the set of states in Definition 2 as follows.
First, we relax the notion of a state in Definition 2 to be an approximate state defined as
follows.
Definition 4 (Approximate State)
A consistent set of literals δ is called an approximate state (or a-state, for short) if δ satisfies
all static causal laws in D.
Intuitively, δ represents the (possibly incomplete) current knowledge of the agent, i.e., it
contains all fluent literals that are known to be true to the agent. When δ is a subset of some
state s, we say that it is valid. An action a is executable in δ if there exists an executability
condition (2) in D such that ψ holds in δ.
Next, we define what are the possible next a-states after the execution of an action a in a
given a-state δ, provided that a is executable in δ. Consider the case that a is a non-sensing
action. Let
e(a, δ) = ClD({l | ∃ a dynamic causal law (3) such that φ holds in δ}) (9)
and
pc(a, δ) =
⋃∞
i=0 pc
i(a, δ) (10)
where
pc0(a, δ) = {l | ∃ a dynamic causal law (3) s.t. l 6∈ δ and φ possibly holds in δ} (11)
and for i ≥ 0,
pci+1(a, δ) = pci(a, δ)∪ {l | ∃ a static causal law (4) s.t. l 6∈ δ, ϕ ∩ pci(a, δ) 6= ∅,
and ϕ possibly holds in e(a, δ)} (12)
Intuitively, e(a, δ) and pc(a, δ) denote what definitely holds and what may change in the
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next situation respectively 6. Specifically, l ∈ e(a, δ)means that l holds in the next situation
and l ∈ pc(a, δ) means that l is not in δ but possibly holds in the next situation. This
implies that δ \¬pc(a, δ) is an approximation of the set of literals that hold by inertia after
the execution of a in δ. Taking into account the effects of the static causal laws, we have
that the set of literals δ′ = ClD(e(a, δ)∪(δ\¬pc(a, δ))) must hold in the next situation.
This leads us to the following definition of the possible next a-states after a non-sensing
action gets executed.
Definition 5 (0-Result Function)
For every a-state δ and non-sensing action a executable in δ, let
δ′ = ClD(e(a, δ)∪(δ\¬pc(a, δ))).
Define
1. ResD(a, δ) = {δ′} if δ′ is consistent.
2. ResD(a, δ) = ∅ if δ′ is inconsistent.
The next examples illustrate this definition.
Example 5
Consider the domain description D1 in Example 2. Let δ = {¬open, closed,¬locked}.
We can easily check that δ is an a-state of D1. We have
e(flip lock, δ) = ClD1({locked}) = {¬open,¬closed, locked}
and
pc0(flip lock, δ) = {locked}
Because if(¬open, {locked}) ∈ D1, and if(¬closed, {locked}) ∈ D1, by (12), we have
pc1(flip lock, δ) = {locked,¬closed}
Note that ¬open 6∈ pc1(flip lock, δ) because it is already in δ.
It is easy to see that pci(flip lock, δ) = pc1(flip lock, δ) for all i > 1. Hence, we have
pc(flip lock, δ) =
∞⋃
i=0
pci(flip lock, δ) = {¬closed, locked}
Accordingly, we have
ResD1(flip lock, δ) = {ClD1(e(flip lock, δ) ∪ (δ \ ¬pc(flip lock, δ)))} =
{ClD1({¬open,¬closed, locked})} = {{¬open,¬closed, locked}}
✷
6 Note that the operator ClD is used in the definition of e(a, δ) to maximize what definitely holds in the next
situation.
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Example 6
For the domain description D2 in Example 4, we have
e(a, s) = ClD2({f}) = {f}
pc0(a, s) = {f}
As if(g, {f,¬h}) ∈ D2 and if(h, {f,¬g}) ∈ D2, we have
pc1(a, s) = {f, g, h}
Note that k 6∈ pc1(a, s) since ¬f does not hold in e(a, s). We can check that pci(a, s) =
pc1(a, s) for all i > 1. Hence, we have
pc(a, s) = {f, g, h}
As a result, we have
ResD2(a, s) = {ClD2(e(a, s) ∪ (s \ ¬pc(a, s)))} = {ClD2({f, k})} = {{f, k}}
✷
The following proposition shows that when a non-sensing action is executed, the Res-
function is deterministic in the sense that it returns at most one possible next a-state; fur-
thermore, it is “sound” with respect to the Resc-function.
Proposition 1
Let D be a consistent domain description. For any state s, a-state δ ⊆ s, and non-sensing
action a executable in δ, there exists an a-state δ′ such that (i) ResD(a, δ) = {δ′}, and (ii)
δ′ is a subset of every state s′ ∈ RescD(a, s).
Proof
see Appendix A.
We have specified what are the possible next a-states after a non-sensing action is per-
formed. Let us move to the case when a sensing action is executed. Consider an a-state δ
and a sensing action a with k-proposition (5) inD. Intuitively, after a is executed, the agent
will know the values of literals in θ. Thus, the set of possible next a-states can be defined
as follows.
Definition 6 (0-Result Function)
For every a-state δ and sensing action a with proposition (5) such that a is executable in δ ,
ResD(a, δ) = {ClD(δ ∪ {g}) | g ∈ θ and ClD(δ ∪ {g}) is consistent}
Roughly speaking, executing awill result in several possible next a-states, in each of which
exactly one sensed-literal in θ holds. However, some of them might be inconsistent with
what is currently known. For example, if the security robot in Example 1 knows that the
window is not open then after it checks the window, it should not consider the case that the
window is open because this is inconsistent with its current knowledge. Thus, in defining
the set of possible next a-states resulting from the execution of a sensing action, we need
to exclude such inconsistent a-states. The following example illustrates this.
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Example 7
Consider again the domain description D1 in Example 2 and an a-state δ1 = {¬open}.
We have
ClD1(δ1 ∪ {open}) = {open,¬open, closed,¬closed, locked,¬locked} = δ1,1
ClD1(δ1 ∪ {closed}) = {¬open, closed,¬locked} = δ1,2
ClD1(δ1 ∪ {locked}) = {¬open,¬closed, locked} = δ1,3
Among those, δ1,1 is inconsistent. Therefore, we have
ResD1(check, δ1) = {δ1,2, δ1,3}
✷
The next proposition shows that if a sensing action is performed in a valid a-state then
the set of possible next a-states will contain at least one valid a-state. This corresponds to
the fact that if the current knowledge of the world of the agent is consistent with the state
of the world, it will remain consistent with the state of the world after the agent acquires
additional knowledge through the execution of a sensing action.
Proposition 2
Let D be a consistent domain description. For any a-state δ, and a sensing action a exe-
cutable in δ, if δ is valid then ResD(a, δ) contains at least one valid a-state.
Proof
see Appendix A.
The transition function Φ that maps actions and a-states into sets of a-states is defined as
follows.
Definition 7 (Transition Function)
Given a domain description D, for any action a and a-state δ,
1. if a is not executable in δ then
Φ(a, δ) =⊥
2. otherwise,
Φ(a, δ) = ResD(a, δ)
The transition function Φ returns the set of possible next a-states after performing a
single action in a given a-state. We now extend it to define the set of possible next a-states
after the execution of a plan. The extended transition function, called Φˆ, is given in the
following definition.
Definition 8 (Extended Transition Function)
Given a domain description D, for any plan p and a-state δ,
1. if p = [] then
Φˆ(p, δ) = {δ}
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2. if p = [a; q], where a is a non-sensing action and q is a sub-plan, then
Φˆ(p, δ) =
{
⊥ if Φ(a, δ) = ⊥⋃
δ′∈Φ(a,δ) Φˆ(q, δ
′) otherwise
3. if p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action and pj’s are sub-plans,
then
Φˆ(p, δ) =
{
⊥ if Φ(a, δ) = ⊥⋃
1≤j≤n,δ′∈Φ(a,δ),gj holds in δ′ Φˆ(pj , δ
′) otherwise
where, by convention, . . . ∪ ⊥ ∪ . . . = ⊥.
Items (2) and (3) of the above definition deserve some elaboration.
Remark 3
During the execution of a plan p, when a non-sensing action a is encountered (Item 2), by
Definitions 5 and 7, there are three possibilities: Φ(a, δ) = ⊥, Φ(a, δ) = ∅, or Φ(a, δ) =
{δ′} for some a-state δ′. If the first case occurs then the result of execution of p in δ by
the definition is also ⊥. In this case, we say that p is not executable in δ; otherwise, p is
executable in δ. If the second case occurs then by the definition, Φˆ(p, δ) = ∅. One may
notice that, by Proposition 1, this case takes place only if there exists no state s such that
δ ⊆ s (i.e., δ is invalid), or the domain is inconsistent. When Φ(a, δ) = {δ′}, then the
result of the execution of p in δ is exactly as the result of the execution of the rest of p in
δ′.
Remark 4
If p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action and pj’s are sub-plans
(Item 3), and Φ(a, δ) 6= ⊥ then by Definitions 6 and 7, we know that Φ(a, δ) may contain
several a-states δj’s. Each δj corresponds to an a-state in which literal gj holds. Therefore,
we define Φˆ(p, δ) to be the union of the sets of possible a-states that are the results of the
execution of pj in δj . Note that when we add gj to the current state δ to generate δj , we
assume that gj holds. However, if later on, during the execution of the rest of p, which is
pj , we discover that Φˆ(pj , δj) = ∅, then our assumption about gj is not correct. Therefore,
such a δj contributes nothing to the set of possible a-states of Φˆ(a, δ). To see how this can
happen, consider the following domain description
D3 =


executable(a, {})
executable(b, {})
causes(b, h, {})
if(f, {g, h})
if(f, {g,¬h})
determines(a, f)


and suppose that the set of fluents is {f, g, h}. Let us see what are the final possible
a-states after the execution of plan p = [a; cases({f → b;¬f → b})] in a-state δ = {g}
as defined by the extended transition function.
When a is performed, we generate two possible next a-states δ1 = {g, f}, and δ2 =
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{g,¬f}. Executing b in δ2 results in no possible next a-state because ClD3({g,¬f, h}) =
{g,¬f, h, f} is not consistent. This means that Φ(b, δ2), and thus Φˆ([b], δ2), become ∅.
Therefore, the set of possible final a-states is Φˆ(p, δ) = Φˆ([b], δ1) = {{f, g, h}}.
Note that in this example, we did not notice that δ2 is inconsistent at the time the action
a was performed. Rather, its inconsistency was only realized after the execution of b. In
other words, our assumption that ¬f holds was not correct.
Similarly to the execution of a non-sensing action, when a sensing action a is performed,
by Proposition 2, Φ(a, δ) = ∅ only if the domain is inconsistent or δ is invalid.
The above remarks imply that in some cases, for a plan p and an a-state δ, Φˆ(p, δ) may be
empty. Intuitively, this is because either δ is invalid or the domain is inconsistent. We will
show that under reasonable assumptions about δ and the domain, this cannot happen.
Definition 9 (Consistent Action Theories)
An action theory (D, I) is consistent if D is consistent and its initial a-state, defined by
ClD({l | initially(l) ∈ I}), is valid.
The next proposition says that the execution of an executable plan from a valid a-state of a
consistent action theory will result in at least one valid a-state.
Proposition 3
Let (D, I) be a consistent action theory and let δ be its initial a-state. For every conditional
plan p, if Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥ then Φˆ(p, δ) contains at least one valid a-state.
Proof
see Appendix A.
The above proposition implies that if the action theory (D, I) is consistent and δ is its
initial a-state then the execution of p in δ will yield at least a valid trajectory7, provided
that p is executable in δ. This is consistent with the fact that if the initial a-state is complete
(i.e., if we have complete information) then the execution of an executable plan in the
initial a-state would return a valid trajectory. From now on, we only consider consistent
action theories.
We next define the entailment relationship between action theories and queries.
Definition 10 (Entailment)
Let (D, I) be an action theory and δ be its initial a-state. For a plan p and a fluent formula
ρ, we say that
• (D, I) entails the query knows ρ after p and write
D |=I knows ρ after p
if Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥ and ρ is true in every a-state in Φˆ(p, δ); and
• (D, I) entails the query whether ρ after p and write
D |=I whether ρ after p
if Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥ and ρ is known in every a-state in Φˆ(p, δ).
7 A trajectory is an alternate sequence of a-states and actions, δ0a1δ1a2 . . . anδn, such that δi ∈ Φ(ai, δi−1)
for i = 1, . . . , n; A trajectory is valid if δi’s are valid a-states.
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Example 8
For the action theory (D1, I1) in Example 2, we will show that
D1 |=I1 knows locked after p2 (13)
where p2 is given in Example 3.
Let p2,1 = [], p2,2 = [flip lock] and p2,3 = []. It is easy to see that the initial a-state of
(D1, I1) is δ1 = {¬open}.
It follows from Example 7 that
Φ(check, δ1) = {δ1,2, δ1,3}
On the other hand, we have
Φˆ(p2,2, δ1,2) = {{locked,¬open,¬closed}}
and
Φˆ(p2,3, δ1,3) = {{locked,¬open,¬closed}}
Therefore, we have
Φˆ(p2, δ1) = Φˆ(p2,2, δ1,2) ∪ Φˆ(p2,3, δ1,3) = {{locked,¬open,¬closed}}
Since locked is true in {locked,¬open,¬closed}, we have (13) holds. On the other
hand, because closed is false in {locked,¬open,¬closed}, we have
D1 6|=I1 knows closed after p2 but D1 |=I1 knows ¬closed after p2.
Likewise, we can prove that
D1 |=I1 knows locked after p3 and D1 |=I1 knows locked after p4.
Definition 11 (Solutions)
A plan p is called a solution to a planning problem instance P = (D, I,G) iff
D |=I knows G after p
When p is a solution to P , we say that p is a plan that achieves the goal G.
According to this definition, it is easy to see that plans p2, p3, and p4 in Example 3 are
solutions to P1 = (D1, I1,G1) in Example 2.
2.5 Properties of the 0-Approximation
We will now discuss some properties of the 0-approximation. For a domain description
D, we define the size of D to be the sum of (1) the number of fluents; (2) the number of
actions; and (3) the number of propositions in D. The size of a planning problem instance
P = (D, I,G) is defined as the size of D. The size of a plan p, denoted by size(p), is
defined as follows.
1. size([]) = 0;
2. size([a; p]) = 1 + size(p) if a is a non-sensing action and p is a plan; and
3. size([a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)]) = 1 +Σnj=1(1 + size(pj)) if a is a sensing action
and pj’s are plans.
Then, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4
For a domain description D, an action a, and an a-state δ, computing Φ(a, δ) can be done
in polynomial time in the size of D.
Proof
see Appendix A.
From this proposition, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1
Determining whether or not a plan p is a solution of the planning problem instance P =
(D, I,G) from an a-state δ can be done in polynomial time in the size of p and P .
Definition 12
The conditional planning problem is defined as follows.
• Given: A planning problem instance P = (D, I,G) of size n and a polynomial
Q(n) ≥ n;
• Determine: whether there exists a conditional plan, whose size is bounded by Q(n),
that achieves G from I (with respect to Definition 11).
Theorem 1
The conditional planning problem is NP-complete.
Proof
see Appendix A.
The above theorem shows that planning using the 0-approximation has lower complexity
than planning with respect to the full semantics. Here, by the full semantics we mean the
possible world semantics extended to domains with sensing actions. Yet, the price one has
to pay is the incompleteness of this approximation, i.e., there are planning instances which
have solutions with respect to the full semantics but do not have solutions with respect to
the approximation. This can be seen in the following example.
Example 9
Consider the planning problem instance P=(D, I,G) with
D = {causes(a, f, {g}), causes(a, f, {¬g})}, I = ∅, and G = {f}.
We can easily check that p = [a] is a plan achieves f from every initial situation (with re-
spect to the possible world semantics developed for AcK in (Baral et al. 2000b)). However,
p is not a solution with respect to Definition 11, because D 6|=I knows f after a.
The above example highlights the main weakness of this approximation in that it does
not allow for reasoning by cases for non-sensing actions or in the presence of disjunctive
initial situation. In our experiments with the benchmarks, we observe that most of the
benchmarks that our planner could not solve fall into the second category, i.e., they require
the capability of reasoning with disjunctive information about the initial state. Given that
we do not consider action theories with disjunctive initial state, this should not come as a
surprise.
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3 A Logic Programming Based Conditional Planner
This section describes an answer set programming based conditional planner, called ASCP.
Given a planning problem instance P = (D, I,G), we translate it into a logic program
πh,w(P), where h and w are two input parameters whose meanings will become clear
shortly, and then use an answer set solver (e.g., smodels or cmodels) to compute its
answer sets. The answer sets of πh,w(P) represent solutions to P . Our intuition behind this
task rests on the observation that each plan p (Definition 1) corresponds to a labeled plan
tree Tp defined as below.
• If p = [] then Tp is a tree with a single node.
• If p = [a], where a is a non-sensing action, then Tp is a tree with a single node and
this node is labeled with a.
• If p = [a; q], where a is a non-sensing action and q is a non-empty plan, then Tp is a
tree whose root is labeled with a and has only one subtree which is Tq. Furthermore,
the link between a and Tq’s root is labeled with an empty string.
• If p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action that determines
gj’s, then Tp is a tree whose root is labeled with a and has n subtrees {Tpj | j ∈
{1, . . . , n}}. For each j, the link from a to the root of Tpj is labeled with gj .
Observe that each trajectory of the plan p corresponds to a path from the root to a leave
of Tp. As an example, Figure 1 depicts the labeled trees for plans p1, p2, p3 and p4 in
Example 3 (black nodes indicate that there exists an action occurring at those nodes, while
white nodes indicate that there is no action occurring at those nodes).
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Fig. 1. Sample plan trees
For a plan p, let α be the number of leaves of Tp and β be the number of nodes along the
longest path from the root to the leaves of Tp. α and β will be called the width and height
of Tp respectively. Suppose w and h are two integers that such that α ≤ w and β ≤ h.
Let us denote the leaves of Tp by x1, . . . , xα. We map each node y of Tp to a pair of
integers ny = (ty ,py), where ty is the number of nodes along the path from the root to y,
and py is defined in the following way.
• For each leaf xi of Tp, pxi is an arbitrary integer between 1 and w. Furthermore,
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there exists a leaf x with p-value of 1, i.e., px = 1, and there exist no i 6= j such that
pxi = pxj .
• For each interior node y of Tp with children y1, . . . , yr, py = min{py1, . . . , pyr}.
For instance, Figure 2 shows some possible mappings with h = 4 and w = 5 for the
trees in Figure 1. It is easy to see that if α ≤ w and β ≤ h then such a mapping always
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Fig. 2. Possible mappings for the trees in Figure 1
exists. Furthermore, from the construction of Tp, independently of how the leaves of Tp
are numbered, we have the following properties.
1. For every node y, ty ≤ h and py ≤ w.
2. For a node y, all of its children have the same t-value. That is, if y has r children
y1, . . . , yr then tyi = tyj for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r. Furthermore, the p-value of y is the
smallest one among the p-values of its children.
3. The root of Tp is always mapped to the pair (1, 1).
Our encoding is based on the above mapping. We observe that a conditional plan p can
be represented on a grid h × w where each node y of Tp is placed at the position (ty , py)
relative to the leftmost top corner of the grid. This way, it is guaranteed that the root of Tp
is always placed at the leftmost top corner. Figure 3 depicts the 4 × 5 grid representation
of conditional plans Tp3 and Tp4 in Figure 2. As it can be seen in Figure 3, each path
(trajectory) of the plan can end at an arbitrary time point. For example, the leftmost and
rightmost trajectories of TP4 end at 2, whereas the others end at 3. On the other hand, to
check if the plan is indeed a solution, we need to check the satisfaction of the goal at every
leaf node of the plan, that is, at the end of each trajectory. In our encoding, this task is
simplified by extending all the trajectories of the plan so that they have the same height
h + 1 and then checking the goal at the end of each extended trajectory (see Figure 3).
Note that an a-state associated with each node on the extended part of each trajectory in
our encoding will be guaranteed to be the same as the one associated with the end node of
the original trajectory.
We now describe the program πh,w(P) in the syntax of smodels (for a concrete
example, see Appendix C). In πh,w(P), variables of sorts time and path correspond
to rows and columns of the grid. Instead of using the predicate holds(L, T ) (see, e.g.,
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(Dimopoulos et al. 1997; Lifschitz 1999)) to denote that a literal L holds at the time T , we
use the predicate holds(L, T, P ) to represent the fact that L holds at node (T, P ) (the time
moment T , the path number P on the grid).
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Fig. 3. Grid representation of conditional plans
The program πh,w(P) contains the following elements.
1. Constants. There are two constants used in the program h and w which serve as the
input parameters of the program. In addition, we have constants to denote fluents,
literals and actions in the domain. Due to the fact that smodels does not allow
symbol ¬, to represent a literal constant ¬f , we will use neg(f).
2. Predicates. The program uses the following predicates.
• time(T ) is true if 1 ≤ T ≤ h.
• time1(T1) is true if 1 ≤ T1 ≤ h+ 1.
• path(P ) is true if 1 ≤ P ≤ w.
• fluent(F ) is true if F is a fluent.
• literal(L) is true if L is a literal.
• contrary(L,L1) is true if L and L1 are two complementary literals.
• sense(L) is true if L is a sensed literal.
• action(A) is true if A is an action
• holds(L, T, P ) is true if literal L holds at (T, P ).
• poss(A, T, P ) is true if action A is executable at (T, P ).
• occ(A, T, P ) is true if action A occurs at (T, P ). That means the node (T, P )
in Tp is labeled with action A.
• e(L, T, P ) is true if literal L is an effect of a non-sensing action occurring at
(T, P ).
• pc(L, T, P ) is true if literal L may change at (T + 1, P ).
• goal(T, P ) is true if the goal is satisfied at (T, P ).
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• br(G, T, P, P1) is true if there exists a branch from (T, P ) to (T + 1, P1)
labeled with G in Tp. For example, in the grid representation of Tp3 (Figure
3), we have br(open, 1, 1, 1), br(closed, 1, 1, 2), and br(locked, 1, 1, 5).
• used(T, P ) is true if (T, P ) belongs to some extended trajectory of the plan.
This allows us to know which paths are used in the construction of the plan and
thus to be able to check if the plan satisfies the goal. As an example, for Tp3 in
Figure 3, we have used(t, 1) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 5, and used(t, 2) and used(t, 5) for
2 ≤ t ≤ 5. The goal satisfaction, hence, will be checked at nodes used(5, 1),
used(5, 2), and used(5, 5).
3. Variables. The following variables are used in the program.
• F : a fluent variable.
• L and L1: literal variables.
• T and T1: time variables, in ranges 1..h and 1..h+ 1 respectively,
• G, G1 and G2: sensed−literal variables.
• A: an action variable.
• P , P1, and P2: path variables, in range 1..w.
The domains of these variables are declared in smodels using the keyword#domain
(see Appendix C for more details). Observe that the type of each variable has to be
declared accordingly if this feature of smodels is not used.
4. Rules. The program has the following facts to define variables of sort time and
path:
time(1..h) ←
time1(1..h+ 1) ←
path(1..w) ←
For each action a, fluent f , or sensed-literal g in the domain, πh,w(P) contains the
following facts respectively
action(a) ←
fluent(f) ←
sense(g) ←
The remaining rules of πh,w(P) are divided into three groups: (i) domain dependent
rules; (ii) goal representation and (iii) domain independent rules, which are given
next. Note that they are shown in a shortened form in which the following shortening
conventions are used.
• Two contrary literal variables are written as L and ¬L.
• For a predicate symbol p, and a set γ of literals or actions, we will write
p(γ, . . .) to denote the set of atoms {p(x, . . .) | x ∈ γ}.
• For a literal constant l, ¬l stands for neg(f) (resp. f ) if l = f (resp. l = ¬f )
for some fluent f .
For example, the rule (28) stands for the following rule
holds(L, T+1, P )← holds(L, T, P ), contrary(L,L1), not pc(L1, T, P )
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3.1 Domain dependent rules
• Rules encoding the initial situation. For each v-proposition (1) in I, πh,w(P) con-
tains the fact
holds(l, 1, 1) ← (14)
• Rules encoding actions’ executability conditions. For each executability condition
(2) in D, πh,w(P) contains the rule
poss(a, T, P ) ← holds(ψ, T, P ) (15)
• Rules for reasoning about the effect of non-sensing actions. For each dynamic
causal law (3) in D, we add to πh,w(P) the following rules:
e(l, T, P ) ← occ(a, T, P ), holds(φ, T, P ) (16)
pc(l, T, P ) ← occ(a, T, P ), not holds(l, T, P ), not holds(¬φ, T, P ) (17)
Here, a is a non-sensing action. Its execution changes the world according to the
Res-function. The first rule, when used along with (22), encodes what definitely
holds as the effect of a in the next a-state. The second rule, when used along with
(21), describes what would potentially be changed by a (see the definitions of e(a, δ)
and pc(a, δ) in Subsection 2.4). Note that in the second rule, not holds(¬φ, T, P )
stands for {not holds(¬l) | l ∈ φ}, meaning that φ possibly holds at (T, P ). These
rules will be used in cooperation with (23), (27), and (28) to define the next a-state
after the execution of a non-sensing action.
• Rules for reasoning about the effect of sensing actions. For each k-proposition
(5) in D, πh,w(P) contains the following rules:
← occ(a, T, P ), not br(θ, T, P, P ) (18)
1{br(g, T, P,X):new br(P,X)}1 ← occ(a, T, P ) (19)
(g ∈ θ)
← occ(a, T, P ), holds(g, T, P ) (20)
(g ∈ θ)
The first rule assures that if a sensing action a occurs at (T, P ) then there must be
a branch from (T, P ) to (T + 1, P ). The second rule ensures that a new branch,
corresponding to a new successor a-state, will be created for each literal sensed by
the action. The last rule is a constraint that prevents a from taking place if one of
the literals sensed by the action is already known. With this rule, the returned plan
is guaranteed to be optimal in the sense that a sensing action should not occur if
one of the literals sensed by the action already holds. Observe that the semantics of
AcK does not prevent a sensing action to execute when some of its sensed-fluents is
known. For this reason, some solutions to a planning problem instance might not be
found using this encoding. However, as we will see later, the program will generate
an “equivalent” plan to those solutions. Subsection 4.2 will elaborate more on this
issue.
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• Rules for reasoning about static causal laws. For each static causal law (4) in D,
πh,w(P) contains the rules
pc(l, T, P ) ← not holds(l, T, P ), pc(l′, T, P ),
not e(¬ϕ, T, P ) (21)
(l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, T, P ) ← e(ϕ, T, P ) (22)
holds(l, T1, P ) ← holds(ϕ, T1, P ) (23)
Rules in this group encode the equations (10)-(12) and the operator ClD .
3.2 Goal representation
The following rules encode the goal and make sure that it is always achieved at the end of
every possible branch created by the execution of the plan.
goal(T1, P ) ← holds(G, T1, P ) (24)
goal(T1, P ) ← holds(L, T1, P ), holds(¬L, T1, P ) (25)
← used(h+1, P ), not goal(h+1, P ) (26)
The first rule says that the goal is satisfied at a node if all of its subgoals are satisfied at that
node. The last rule guarantees that if a path P is used in the construction of a plan then the
goal must be satisfied at the end of this path, that is, at node (h+ 1, P ).
Rule (25) deserves some explanation. Intuitively, the presence of holds(L, T, P ) and
holds(¬L, T, P ) indicates that the a-state at the node (T, P ) is inconsistent. This means
that no action should be generated at this node as inconsistent a-states will be removed
by the extended transition function (Definition 8). To achieve this effect8, we say that the
“goal” has been achieved at (T, P ). The inclusion of this rule might raise the question:
is it possible for the program to generate a plan whose execution yields inconsistent a-
states only. Fortunately, due to Proposition 3, this will not be the case for consistent action
theories.
3.3 Domain independent rules
• Rules encoding the effect of non-sensing actions. Rules (16) – (17) specify what
definitely holds and what could potentially be changed in the next a-state as the effect
of a non-sensing action. The following rules encode the effect and frame axioms for
non-sensing actions.
holds(L, T+1, P ) ← e(L, T, P ) (27)
holds(L, T+1, P ) ← holds(L, T, P ), not pc(¬L, T, P ) (28)
When used in conjunction with (16) – (17), they define the Res function.
8 The same effect can be achieved by (i) introducing a new predicate, say stop(T, P ), to represent that the a-
state at (T, P ) is inconsistent; (ii) adding not stop(T, P ) in the body of rule (35) to prevent action to occur
at (T, P ); and (iii) modifying the rule (26) accordingly.
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• Inertial rules for sensing actions. This group of rules encodes the fact that the
execution of a sensing action does not change the world. However, there is one-to-
one correspondence between the set of sensed literals and the set of possible next
a-states after the execution of a sensing action.
← P1 < P2, P2 < P, br(G1, T, P1, P ),
br(G2, T, P2, P ) (29)
← P1 ≤ P,G1 6= G2, br(G1, T, P1, P ),
br(G2, T, P1, P ) (30)
← P1 < P, br(G, T, P1, P ), used(T, P ) (31)
used(T+1, P ) ← P1 < P, br(G, T, P1, P ) (32)
holds(G, T+1, P ) ← P1 ≤ P, br(G, T, P1, P ) (33)
holds(L, T+1, P ) ← P1 < P, br(G, T, P1, P ), holds(L, T, P1) (34)
The first three rules make sure that there is no cycle in the plan that we are encoding.
The next rule is to mark a node as used if there exists a branch in the plan that
coming to that node. This allows us to know which paths on the grid are used in the
construction of the plan and thus to be able to check if the plan satisfies the goal (see
rule (26)).
The last two rules, along with rule (23), encode the possible next a-state correspond-
ing to the branch denoted by literal G after a sensing action is performed in a state
δ. They say that such a-state should contain G (rule (33)) and literals that hold in δ
(rule (34)).
Note that because for each literal G sensed by a sensing action a, we create a cor-
responding branch (rules (18) and (19)), the rules of this group guarantee that all
possible next a-states after a is performed are generated.
• Rules for generating action occurrences.
1{occ(X,T, P ) : action(X)}1 ← used(T, P ), not goal(T, P ) (35)
← occ(A, T, P ), not poss(A, T, P ) (36)
The first rule enforces exactly one action to take place at a node that was used but the
goal has not been achieved. The second one guarantees that only executable actions
can occur.
• Auxiliary Rules.
literal(F ) ← (37)
literal(¬F ) ← (38)
contrary(F,¬F ) ← (39)
contrary(¬F, F ) ← (40)
new br(P, P1) ← P ≤ P1 (41)
used(1, 1) ← (42)
used(T+1, P ) ← used(T, P ) (43)
The first four rules define literals and contrary literals. Rule (41) says that a newly
24 Phan Huy Tu, Tran Cao Son, and Chitta Baral
created branch should outgo to a path number greater than the current path. The last
two rules mark nodes that have been used.
4 Properties of ASCP
This section discusses some important properties of ASCP. We begin with how to extract
a solution from an answer set returned by ASCP. Then, we argue that ASCP is sound and
complete with respect to the 0-approximation semantics. We also show that ASCP can be
used as a conformant planner. Finally, we present how to modify ASCP to act as a reasoner.
4.1 Solution Extraction
In some previous answer set based planners (Dimopoulos et al. 1997; Eiter et al. 2003;
Lifschitz 1999), reconstructing a plan from an answer set for a logic program encoding
the planning problem instance is quite simple: we only need to collect the action occur-
rences in the model and then order them by the time they occur. In other words, if the
answer set contains occ(a1, 1), . . ., occ(am,m) then the plan is a1, . . . , am. For πh,w(P),
the reconstruction process is not that simple because each answer set for πh,w(P) rep-
resents a conditional plan which may contain conditionals in the form br(l, t, p, p1). The
following procedure describes how to extract such a plan from an answer set.
Let P = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance and S be an answer set for πh,w(P).
For any pair of integers, 1 ≤ i ≤ h+ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ w, we define pki (S) as follows:
pki (S) =


[] if i = h+ 1 or occ(a, i, k) 6∈ S for all a
a; pki+1(S) if occ(a, i, k) ∈ S and
a is a non-sensing action
a; cases({gj → p
kj
i+1(S)}
n
j=1) if occ(a, i, k) ∈ S,
a is a sensing action, and
br(gj , i, k, kj) ∈ S for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
Intuitively, pki (S) is the conditional plan whose corresponding tree is rooted at node (i, k)
on the grid h × w. p11(S) is, therefore, a solution to P . This is stated in Theorem 2 in the
next subsection.
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 2
Let (D, I) be a consistent action theory, P = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance
and h ≥ 1 and w ≥ 1 be integers. If πh,w(P) returns an answer set S then p11(S) is a
solution to P .
Proof
see Appendix B.
Theorem 2 shows the soundness of πh,w(P). We will now turn our attention to the com-
pleteness of πh,w(P). Observe that solutions generated by πh,w(P) are optimal in the
following sense
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1. actions do not occur once the goal is achieved or a possible next a-state does not
exist; and
2. sensing actions do not occur if one of its sensed literals holds.
The first property holds because of rule (35) and the second property holds because of
constraint (20). Since the definition of a conditional plan in general does not rule out non-
optimal plans, obviously πh,w(P) will not generate all possible solutions to P .
For example, consider the planning problem instance P1 in Example 2. We have seen
that plans p2, p3, and p4 in Example 3 are all solutions to P1. However, p3 and p4 are not
optimal because they do not satisfy the above two properties.
The above example shows that πh,w(P) is not complete w.r.t. the 0-approximation in
the sense that no one-to-one correspondence between its answer sets and solutions to P
exists. However, we will show next that it is complete in the sense that for each solution
p to P , there exist two integers h and w such that πh,w(P) will generate an answer set
S whose corresponding plan, p11(S), can be obtained from p by applying the following
transformation (called the reduct operation).
Definition 13 (Reduct of a plan)
Let P = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance, p be a plan and δ be an a-state such
that Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥. A reduct of p with respect to δ, denoted by reductδ(p), is defined as
follows.
1. if p = [] or δ |= G then
reductδ(p) = []
2. if p = [a; q], where a is a non-sensing action and q is a plan, then
reductδ(p) =
{
a; reductδ′(q) if Φ(a, δ) = {δ′}
a otherwise
3. if p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action that senses g1, . . . , gn,
then
reductδ(p) =
{
reductδ(pk) if gk holds in δ for some k
a; cases({gj → qj}nj=1) otherwise
where
qj =
{
[] if ClD(δ ∪ {gj}) is inconsistent
reductClD(δ∪{gj})(pj) otherwise
Example 10
Consider the planning problem instance P1 in Example 2 and plans p2, p3, and p4 in
Example 3. Let δ = {¬open}. We will show that
reductδ(p3) = p2 (44)
and
reductδ(p4) = p2 (45)
Because open, closed, and locked do not hold in δ, we have
reductδ(p3) = check; cases({open→ q1, closed→ q2, locked→ q3})
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where qj’s are defined as in Definition 13.
Let
δ1 = ClD1(δ ∪ {open}) = {open,¬open, closed,¬closed, locked,¬locked}
δ2 = ClD1(δ ∪ {closed}) = {¬open, closed,¬locked}
δ3 = ClD1(δ ∪ {locked}) = {¬open,¬closed, locked}
It is easy to see that q1 = [] (because δ1 is inconsistent) and q3 = [] (because the sub-plan
corresponding to the branch “locked” in p3 is empty).
Let us compute q2. We have
q2 = reductδ2(flip lock; flip lock; flip lock)
Because δ2 does not satisfy G and Φ(flip lock, δ2) = {δ2,1} 6= ∅, where
δ2,1 = {¬open,¬closed, locked},
we have
q2 = flip lock; reductδ2,1(flip lock; flip lock)
As δ2,1 satisfies G, we have reductδ2,1(flip lock; flip lock) = []. Hence, q2 = flip lock.
Accordingly, we have
reductδ(p3) = check; cases({open→ [], closed→ [flip lock], locked→ []}) = p2
That is, (44) holds.
We now show that (45) holds. It is easy to see that
reductδ(p4) = check; cases({open→ [], closed→ reductδ2(p2), locked→ []})
Because closed holds in δ2, we have
reductδ2(p2) = reductδ2(flip lock) = flip lock
Thus,
reductδ(p4) = check; cases({open→ [], closed→ flip lock, locked→ []}) = p2
As a result, we have (45) holds.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5
Let P = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance and δ be its initial a-state. Then, for
every solution p to P , reductδ(p) is unique and also a solution to P .
Proof
see Appendix B.
The following theorem shows the completeness of our planner with respect to the 0-
approximation semantics.
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Theorem 3
LetP = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance, and p be a solution toP . Then, there ex-
ist two integers h and w such that πh,w(P) has an answer set S and p11(S) = reductδ(p),
where δ is the initial a-state of (D, I).
Proof
see Appendix B.
4.3 Special Case: ASCP as a Conformant Planner
Since conformant planning deals only with incomplete information, it is easy to see that
πh,1(P) can be used to generate conformant plans for P .
Let S be an answer set for πh,1(P). Recall that we assume that each sensing action
senses at least two literals. Hence, w = 1 implies S does not contain occ(a, . . .) where
a is a sensing action because if otherwise rules (19) and (30) cannot be satisfied. Thus,
p11(S) is a sequence of non-sensing actions. By Theorem 2, we know that p11(S) achieves
the goal of P from every possible initial a-state of the domain, which implies that p11(S) is
a conformant plan. In Section 5, we compare the performance of πh,1(P) against some of
the state-of-the-art conformant planners.
4.4 Special Case: ASCP as a Reasoner
It is easy to see that with minor changes, ASCP can be used to compute the consequences of
a plan. This can be done as follows. Given an action theory (D, I), for any integers h,w, let
πh,w(D, I) be the set of rules: πh,w(P)\{(18)−(20), (24)−(26), (29)−(31), (35), (41)}.
Intuitively, πh,w(D, I) is the program obtained from πh,w(P) by removing the rules for (i)
generating the branches when sensing actions are executed; (ii) checking the satisfaction
of the goal; (iii) representing the constraints on branches; and (iv) generating action occur-
rences. For a plan p, let Tp be the corresponding tree for p that is numbered according to
the principles described in the previous section. We define ǫ(p) to be the following set of
atoms
{occ(a, t, p) | ∃ a node x in Tp labeled with action a and numbered with (t, p)} ∪
{br(g, t, p, p′) | ∃a link labeled with g that connects the node numbered with (t, p)
to the node numbered with (t+ 1, p′) in Tp}.
It is easy to see that the program πh,w(D, I) ∪ ǫ(p) has a unique answer set which corre-
sponds to Φˆ(p, s0). This is detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
Let (D, I) be an action theory, p be a plan, ρ be a fluent formula, Tp be the plan tree for p
with a given numbering, and h and w be the height and width of Tp respectively. Let
Π = πh,w(D, I) ∪ ǫ(p).
We have that
• Π has a unique answer set S;
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• D |=I knows ρ after p if and only if
— there exists some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ w, δh+1,j(S) 6= ⊥; and
— for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ w and δh+1,j(S) 6= ⊥, ρ is known to be true in δh+1,j(S).
• D |=I whether ρ after p if and only if
— there exists some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ w, δh+1,j(S) 6= ⊥; and
— for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ w and δh+1,j(S) 6= ⊥, ρ is known in δh+1,j(S).
where
δt,j(S) =


{l | holds(l, t, j) ∈ S} if used(t, j) ∈ S and
{l | holds(l, t, j) ∈ S} is consistent
⊥ otherwise
Proof
The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2 so we omit it for brevity.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate ASCP against other planners using planning benchmarks from
the literature. We first briefly summarize the features of the systems that are used in our ex-
periments. We then describe the benchmarks. Finally, we present the experimental results.
5.1 Planning Systems
The planning systems that we compared with are the following.
• DLVK: DLVK is a declarative, logic-based planning system built on top of the DLV sys-
tem ( http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/ ). The input languageK is
a logic-based planning language described in (Eiter et al. 2003). The version we used
for testing is available at http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/K/ .
DLV
K is capable of generating both concurrent and conformant plans. It, however,
does not support sensing actions and cannot generate conditional plans.
• CMBP (Conformant Model Based Planner) (Cimatti and Roveri 1999; Cimatti and Roveri 2000):
CMBP is a conformant planner developed by Cimatti and Roveri. A planning domain
in CMBP is represented as a finite state automaton. BDD (Binary Decision Diagram)
techniques are employed to represent and search the automaton. CMBP allows non-
deterministic domains with uncertainty in both the initial state and action effects.
Nevertheless, it does not have the capability of generating concurrent and conditional
plans. The input language to CMBP is AR described in (Giunchiglia et al. 1997).
The version used for testing was downloaded from http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/jair/contents/v13.html
.
• KACMBP (Cimatti et al. 2004): Similarly to CMBP, KACMBP uses techniques from
symbolic model checking to search in the belief space. However, in KACMBP, the
search is guided by a heuristic function which is derived based on knowledge asso-
ciated with a belief state.
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KACMBP is designated for sequential and conformant setting. It, however, does
not support concurrent planning and conditional planning. The input language of
KACMBP is SMV. The system was downloaded fromhttp://sra.itc.it/tools/mbp/AIJ04/.
• Conformant-FF (CFF) (Brafman and Hoffmann 2004): CFF9, to our best knowl-
edge, is one of the current fastest conformant planners in most of the benchmark do-
mains in the literature. It extends the classical FF planner (Hoffmann and Nebel 2001)
to deal with uncertainty in the initial state. The basic idea is to represent a belief state
s just by the initial belief state (which is described as a CNF formula) together with
the action sequence that leads to s. In addition, the reasoning is done by checking
the satisfiability of CNF formulae.
The input language of CFF is a subset of PDDL with a minor change that allows the
users to specify the initial state as a CNF formula. Both sequential and and confor-
mant planning are supported in CFF. However, it does not support concurrent and
conditional planning.
• MBP (Bertoli et al. 2001): MBP is a previous version of CMBP. Unlike CMBP which
only deals with conformant planning, MBP supports conditional planning as well.
The version used for testing was downloaded fromhttp://sra.itc.it/tools/mbp/.
• SGP (Sensory Graph Plan) (Weld et al. 1998; Anderson et al. 1998): SGP is a plan-
ner based on the planning graph algorithm proposed by Blum and Furst in (Blum and Furst 95).
SGP supports conditional effects, universal and existential quantification. It also han-
dles uncertainty and sensing actions. SGP has the capability of generating both con-
formant and conditional plans, as well as concurrent plans. Nevertheless, static laws
are not allowed in SGP. The input syntax is PDDL (Planning Domain Definition
Language). The version used for testing is 1.0h (dated January 14th, 2000), written
in Lisp, available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/ai/sgp.html .
• POND (Bryce et al. 2004): POND extends the planning graph algorithm (Blum and Furst 95)
to deal with sensing actions. Conformant planning is also supported as a feature
of POND. The input language is a subset of PDDL. POND was downloaded from
http://rakaposhi.eas.asu.edu/belief-search/.
Table 1 summarizes the features of these planning systems.
ASCP DLVK MBP CMBP SGP POND CFF KACMBP
Input Language AcK K AR AR PDDL PDDL PDDL SMV
Sequential planning yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Concurrent planning no yes no no yes no no no
Conformant planning yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Conditional planning yes no yes no yes yes no no
Table 1. Features of Planning Systems
9 We would like to thank Jo¨rg Hoffmann for providing us with an executable version of the system for testing.
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5.2 Benchmarks
To test the performance of the planners, we prepared two test suites for conformant and
conditional planning, separately. In our preparation, we attempt to encode the planning
problem instances given to the systems in a uniform way (in terms of the number of actions,
fluents, and effects of actions). Due to the differences in the representation languages of
these systems, there are situations in which the encoding of the problems might be different
for each system.
5.2.1 Conformant Planning
We tested the systems on the following domains10:
• Bomb in the Toilet (BT): This set of problems was introduced in (McDermott 1987):
“It has been alarmed that there is a bomb in a lavatory. There are m suspicious pack-
ages, one of which contains the bomb. The bomb can be defused if we dunk the
package that contains the bomb into a toilet.” Experiments were made with m = 2,
4, 6, 8, and 10.
• Bomb in the Toilet with Multiple Toilets (BMT): This set of problems is simi-
lar to the BT problem but we have multiple toilets. There are five problems in this
set, namely BMT (2, 2), BMT (4, 2), BMT (6, 2), BMT (8, 4), and BMT (10, 4),
where the first parameter is the number of suspicious packages and the second pa-
rameter is the number of toilets.
• Bomb in the Toilet with Clogging (BTC): This set of problems is similar to BTs
but we assume that dunking a package clogs the toilet and flushing the toilet unclogs
it. We know that in the beginning, the toilet is unclogged. We did experiments with
m = 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10, where m is the number of suspicious packages.
• Bomb in the Toilet with Multiple Toilets and Clogging (BMTC): This set of prob-
lems is similar to BTC but we have multiple toilets. We did experiments with five
problems BMTC(2, 2), BMTC(4, 2), BMTC(6, 2), BMTC(8, 4), and
BMTC(10, 4), where the first parameter is the number of suspicious packages and
the second parameter is the number of toilets.
• Bomb in the Toilet with Clogging and Uncertainty in Clogging (BTUC): This
set of problems is similar to BTC except that we do not know whether the toilet is
clogged or not in the beginning.
• Bomb in the Toilet with Multiple Toilets and Uncertainty in Clogging (BM-
TUC): This set of problems is similar to BMTC except that we do not know whether
or not each toilet is clogged in the beginning.
• Ring: This set of problems is from (Cimatti et al. 2004). In this domain, one can
move in a cyclic fashion (either forward or backward) around a n-room building to
lock windows. Each room has a window and the window can be locked only if it is
closed. Initially, the robot is in the first room and it does not know the state (open,
closed or locked) of the windows. The goal is to have all windows locked. A possible
10 The system is available at http://www.cs.nmsu.edu/˜tson/ASPlan/Sensing.
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conformant plan is to perform a sequence of actions forward, close, lock repeatedly.
In this domain, we tested with n =2,4,6,8, and 10.
• Domino (DOM): This domain is very simple. We have n dominos standing on a
line in such a way that if one of them falls then the domino on its right also falls.
There is a ball hanging close to the leftmost one. Touching the ball causes the first
domino to fall. Initially, the states of dominos are unknown. The goal is to have the
rightmost one to fall. The solution is obviously to touch the ball. In this domain, we
tested with n =10,20,50,100, 1000, and 10000.
5.2.2 Conditional Planning
The set of problems for testing includes:
• Bomb in the Toilet with Sensing Actions (BTS): This set of examples is taken
from (Weld et al. 1998). They are variations of the BTC problem that allow sensing
actions to be used to determine the existence of a bomb in a specific package. There
are m packages and only one toilet. We can use one of the following methods to
detect a bomb in a package: (1) use a metal detector (action detect metal); (2) use a
trained dog to sniff the bomb (action sniff ); (3) use an x-ray machine (action xray);
and, finally, (4) listen for the ticking of the bomb (action listen for ticking).
This set of examples contains four subsets of problems, namely BTS1(m),
BTS2(m), BTS3(m), and BTS4(m) respectively, where m is the number of sus-
picious packages. These subsets differ from each other in which ones of the above
methods are allowed to use. The first subset allows only one sensing action (1); the
second one allows sensing actions (1)-(2); and so on.
• Medical Problem (MED): This set of problems is from (Weld et al. 1998). A patient
is sick and we want to find the right medication for her. Using a wrong medication
may be fatal. Performing a throat culture will return either red, blue, orwhite, which
determines the group of illness the patient is infected with. Inspecting the color (that
can be performed only after the throat culture is done) allows us to observe the color
returned by a throat culture, depending on the illness of the patient. Analyzing a
blood sample tells us whether or not the patient has a high white cell count. This
can be done only after a blood sample is taken. In addition, we know that in the
beginning, the patient is not dead but infected. In addition, none of the tests have
been done.
There are five problems in this set, namely, MED1, . . ., MED5. These problems
are different from each other in how much we know about the illness of the patient
in the beginning.
• Sick Domain (SICK): This set of problems is similar to MED. A patient is sick and
we need to find a proper medication for her. There are n kinds of illness that she
may be infected with and each requiring a particular medication. Performing throat
culture can return a particular color. Inspecting that color determine what kind of
illness the patient has. Initially, we do not know the exact illness that the patient is
infected with.
The characteristic of this domain is that the length of the plan is fixed (only 3) but
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the width of the plan may be large, depending on the number of illnesses. We did
experiments with five problems in the domain, namely, SICK(2), SICK(4), ...,
SICK(10). They differ from each other in the number of illnesses that the patient
may have.
• Ring (RINGS): This domain is a modification of the RING domain. In this mod-
ified version, the agent can close a window only if it is open. It can lock a window
only if it is closed. The agent can determine the status of a window by observing it
(sensing action observe window).
• Domino (DOMS): This is a variant of the DOM domain in which some domi-
nos may be glued to the table. Unlike the original version of the DOM domain,
in this variant, when a domino falls, the next one falls only if it is not glued. The
agent can do an action to unglue a glued domino. We introduce a new sensing action
observe domino(X) to determine whether a domino X is glued or not.
5.3 Performance
We ran our experiments on a 2.4 GHz CPU, 768MB RAM, DELL machine, running
Slackware 10.0 operating system. We compared ASCP with DLVK, CMBP, SGP, CFF and
KACMBP on the conformant benchmarks and with SGP, POND, and MBP on the condi-
tional benchmarks. Time limit was set to 30 minutes. The CMU Common Lisp version 19a
was used to run SGP examples. We ran ASCP examples on both cmodels and smodels.
By convention, in what follows, we will use ASCPc and ASCPs to refer to the planner ASCP
when it was run on cmodels and smodels respectively. Sometimes, if the distinction
between the two is not important, by ASCP we mean both.
The experimental results for conformant and conditional planning are shown in Tables 2
and 3 respectively. Times are in seconds. “TO/AB” indicates that the corresponding planner
does not return a solution within the time limit or stopped abnormally due to some reasons,
for example, out of memory or segmentation fault.
In conformant setting (Table 2), it is noticeable that ASCPc behaves better than ASCPs
in all the conformant benchmark domains, especially in large problems. Furthermore, CFF
and KACMBP are superior to all the other planners on most of the testing problems. Espe-
cially, both of them scale up to larger instances very well, compared with the others. Yet, it
is interesting to observe that ASCPc does not lose out a whole lot against these two planners
in many problems. In the following, we will discuss the performance ASCP in comparison
with CMBP, DLVK, and SGP.
It can be seen that ASCPc is competitive with CMBP and outperforms DLVK and SGP
in most of problems. Specifically, in the BT domain, ASCPc took only 0.12 seconds to
solve the last problem, while DLVK, CMBP, and SGP took 11.37, 0.5 and 2.13 seconds
respectively. ASCPs however is slower than CMBP and SGP in this domain.
In the BMT domain, ASCPs is the worst. ASCPs took more than two minutes to solve
the largest problem in this domain, while CMBP took only 0.53 seconds. ASCPc, however,
is competitive with CMBP and outperforms both DLVK and SGP.
In the BTC domain, although ASCPs is better than DLVK and SGP, its performance is far
from that of CMBP. The time for ASCPs to solve the largest problem is nearly 8 minutes,
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Problem Min. ASCP DLVK CMBP SGP CFF KA-
PL cmodels smodels CMBP
BT(2) 2 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.12
BT(4) 4 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.04 0.12
BT(6) 6 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.42 0.09 0.1
BT(8) 8 0.10 0.33 1.47 0.10 1.04 0.10 0.11
BT(10) 10 0.12 2.54 11.37 0.50 2.13 0.13 0.11
BMT(2,2) 2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07
BMT(4,2) 4 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.03 0.12
BMT(6,2) 6 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.10
BMT(8,4) 8 0.41 4.70 1.70 0.11 3.14 0.09 0.11
BMT(10,4) 10 0.51 152.45 12.18 0.53 5.90 0.12 0.14
BTC(2) 2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.44 0.05 0.12
BTC(4) 7 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.04 21.62 0.06 0.10
BTC(6) 11 0.06 0.33 TO 0.1 TO 0.07 0.11
BTC(8) 15 0.11 0.53 TO 0.79 TO 0.07 0.13
BTC(10) 19 0.12 468.04 TO 9.76 TO 0.13 0.14
BMTC(2,2) 2 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.12
BMTC(4,2) 6 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.05 2.03 0.04 0.09
BMTC(6,2) 10 0.14 0.63 20.02 0.24 TO 0.07 0.12
BMTC(8,4) 12 0.56 60.56 TO TO TO 0.10 0.12
BMTC(10,4) 16 1.44 TO TO TO TO 0.13 0.17
BTUC(2) 4 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.59 0.03 0.09
BTUC(4) 8 0.04 0.11 0.94 0.04 TO 0.04 0.11
BTUC(6) 12 0.06 0.22 524.3 0.11 TO 0.06 0.11
BTUC(8) 16 0.11 4.7 TO 0.96 TO 0.08 0.12
BTUC(10) 20 0.12 TO TO 11.58 TO 0.13 0.16
BMTUC(2,2) 4 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 16.11 0.06 0.11
BMTUC(4,2) 8 0.10 0.23 0.24 0.07 TO 0.09 0.14
BMTUC(6,2) 12 0.14 19.88 1368.28 0.43 TO 0.08 0.14
BMTUC(8,4) 16 0.56 TO TO TO TO 0.13 0.18
BMTUC(10,4) 20 0.63 TO TO TO TO 0.16 0.16
RING(2) 5 0.12 0.47 0.201 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.00
RING(4) 11 0.21 6.76 0.638 0.05 2.28 0.09 0.12
RING(6) 17 31.73 TO TO 0.40 77.10 0.20 0.13
RING(8) 23 1246.58 TO TO 832.73 TO 0.74 0.18
RING(10) 29 TO TO TO TO TO 2.46 0.18
DOM(10) 1 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.04 2.24 0.05 0.13
DOM(20) 1 0.14 0.07 0.24 0.05 33.4 0.29 0.14
DOM(50) 1 0.47 0.40 1368.28 0.06 1315.98 4.44 1.34
DOM(100) 1 1.70 1.64 TO 0.11 TO TO 2.56
DOM(500) 1 31.28 32.52 TO 2.16 TO TO 29.10
DOM(1000) 1 121.91 129.96 TO 9.83 TO TO TO
Table 2. Conformant Planning Performance
while that for CMBP is just 9.76 seconds. Again, ASCPc is the best. It took only 0.12
seconds to solve the same problem.
TheBMTC domain turns out to be hard for DLVK, CMBP, and SGP. None of them were
able to solve the BMTC(8, 4) within the time limit. Although ASCPs was able to solve
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Problem Min. Plan ASCP SGP POND MBP
Length & Width cmodels smodels
BTS1(2) 2x2 0.166 0.088 0.11 0.188 0.047
BTS1(4) 4x4 0.808 1.697 0.22 0.189 0.048
BTS1(6) 6x6 5.959 83.245 2.44 0.233 0.055
BTS1(8) 8x8 25.284 TO 24.24 0.346 0.076
BTS1(10) 10x10 85.476 TO TO 0.918 0.384
BTS2(2) 2x2 0.39 0.102 0.19 0.186 0.038
BTS2(4) 4x4 1.143 3.858 0.32 0.198 0.067
BTS2(6) 6x6 19.478 1515.288 3.23 0.253 2.163
BTS2(8) 8x8 245.902 TO 25.5 0.452 109.867
BTS2(10) 10x10 345.498 TO TO 1.627 178.823
BTS3(2) 2x2 0.357 0.13 0.22 0.185 0.082
BTS3(4) 4x4 1.099 5.329 0.44 0.195 1.93
BTS3(6) 6x6 7.055 TO 3.89 0.258 147.76
BTS3(8) 8x8 56.246 TO 28.41 0.549 AB
BTS3(10) 10x10 248.171 TO TO 2.675 AB
BTS4(2) 2x2 0.236 0.149 0.26 0.194 0.098
BTS4(4) 4x4 1.696 3.556 0.64 0.191 AB
BTS4(6) 6x6 13.966 149.723 4.92 0.264 AB
BTS4(8) 8x8 115.28 TO 30.34 0.708 AB
BTS4(10) 10x10 126.439 TO TO 4.051 AB
MED(1) 1x1 1.444 1.434 0.09 0.187 0.048
MED(2) 5x5 35.989 9.981 0.59 0.193 0.047
MED(3) 5x5 42.791 9.752 1.39 0.2 0.049
MED(4) 5x5 39.501 10.118 7.18 0.205 0.049
MED(5) 5x5 35.963 9.909 44.64 AB 0.05
SICK(2) 3x2 0.234 0.121 0.21 0.189 0.045
SICK(4) 3x4 0.901 0.797 10.29 0.19 0.048
SICK(6) 3x6 5.394 3.9 TO 0.201 0.059
SICK(8) 3x8 17.18 14.025 TO 0.221 0.129
SICK(10) 3x10 82.179 43.709 TO 0.261 0.778
RINGS(1) 3x3 0.768 0.14 0.67 0.198 0.045
RINGS(2) 7x9 1386.299 TO TO 0.206 0.057
RINGS(3) 11x27 TO TO TO 0.391 0.207
RINGS(4) 15x64 TO TO TO 3.054 3.168
DOMS(1) 3x1 0.117 0.203 0.11 0.08 0.043
DOMS(2) 5x4 0.306 0.325 48.82 0.183 0.048
DOMS(3) 7x8 3.646 53.91 TO 0.19 0.057
DOMS(4) 9x16 87.639 TO TO 0.248 0.101
DOMS(5) 11x32 TO TO TO 0.687 0.486
Table 3. Conditional Planning Performance
this instance, it could not solve the last instance. ASCPc on the contrary can solve these
instances very quickly, less than two seconds for each problem.
In the BTUC and BMTUC domains, although not competitive with ASCPc, CMBP
outperforms both DLVK and SGP. For example, CMBP took less than 12 seconds to solve the
largest instance in the BTUC domain, while ASCPs, DLVK, and SGP indicated a timeout.
ASCPs is competitive with DLVK and much better than SGP. Its performance is worse than
CMBP in these domains however.
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The RING domain is really hard for the planners except CFF and KACMBP. CFF
and KACMBP took just a few minutes to solve the largest problem; however, KACMBP
seems to scale up better than CFF on this domain. None of the other planners could solve
the last problem. Among the others, CMBP is the best, followed by ASCPc. CMBP took
around 14 minutes to solve RING(8) while ASCPc took more than 20 minutes. ASCPs is
outperformed by both DLVK and SGP.
In the last domain,DOM , again, CMBP outperforms ASCP, DLVK, and SGP. The solving
time of ASCP for the last problem is around 2 minutes, while that for CMBP is just less
than 10 seconds. DLVK and SGP were able to solve the first three instances of this domain
only. It is worth noting here that the not-very-good performance of CFF and KACMBP on
this domain is because that this domain is in nature very rich in static causal laws, a feature
that is not supported by CFF and KACMBP. Therefore, to encode the domain in CFF and
KACMBP, we had to compile away static causal laws.
The performance of ASCP in the conditional benchmarks is not as good as in the confor-
mant benchmarks, compared with other testing planners. As can be seen in Table 3, it was
outperformed by both POND and MBP in the benchmarks, except in the last two problems
of the BTS3 domain or in the last three of the BTS4, where MBP had a problem with
segmentation fault or memory excess, or in MED(5) problem where POND stopped ab-
normally. Both POND and MBP did very good at testing domains. POND took just a few
seconds to solve each instance in the testing domains. ASCP is also not competitive with
SGP in small instances of the first five domains (BTS1-MED). However, when scaling up
to larger problems, ASCPc seems to be better than SGP. In the last three domains (SICK ,
RINGS, and DOMS), SGP is outperformed by both ASCPc and ASCPs.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we define an approximation for action theories with static causal laws and
sensing actions. We prove that the newly developed approximation is sound with respect to
the possible world semantics and is deterministic when non-sensing actions are executed.
We also show that the approximation reduces the complexity of the conditional planning
problem.
We use the approximation to develop an answer set programming based conditional
planner, called ASCP. ASCP differs from previously developed model-based planners for
domains with incomplete initial state (e.g. (Bonet and Geffner 2000; Cimatti and Roveri 1999;
Eiter et al. 2003; Smith and Weld 1998)) in that it is capable of dealing with sensing ac-
tions and generating both conditional and conformant plans. We prove the correctness of
ASCP by showing that plans generated by ASCP are solutions of the encoded planning
problem instances. Furthermore, we prove that ASCP will generate a solution to P if it has
a solution with respect to the given approximation. We also discuss the use of ASCP in
reasoning about effects of conditional plans.
We compare ASCP with several planners. These results provide evidence for the useful-
ness of answer set planning in dealing with sensing actions and incomplete information.
Our experiments also show that there are situations in which ASCP does not work as well as
other state-of-the-art planners. In the future, we would like to investigate methods such as
the use of domain knowledge to speed up the planning process (see e.g. (Son et al. 2005a)).
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Appendix A – Proofs related to the 0-Approximation
This appendix contains the proofs for the propositions and theorems given in the paper. As
stated, we assume that the body of each static law (4) is not an empty set and G 6= ∅ for
every planning problem (D, I,G).
We begin with a lemma about the operator ClD that will be used in these proofs. We
need the following definition. Given a domain description D, for a set of literals σ, let
Γ(σ) = σ ∪ {l | ∃if(l, ϕ) ∈ D such that ϕ ⊆ σ}.
Let Γ0(σ) = Γ(σ) and Γi+1(σ) = Γ(Γi(σ)) for i ≥ 0. Since, by the definition of Γ,
for any set of literals σ′ we have σ′ ⊆ Γ(σ′), the sequence 〈Γi(σ)〉∞i=0 is monotonic with
respect to the set inclusion operation. In addition, 〈Γi(σ)〉∞i=0 is bounded by the set of fluent
literals. Thus, there exists σlimit such that σlimitD =
⋃∞
i=0 Γ
i(σ). Furthermore, σlimitD is
unique and satisfies all static causal laws in D.
Lemma 1
For any set of literals σ, we have σlimitD = ClD(σ).
Proof
By induction we can easily show that Γi(σ) ⊆ ClD(σ) for all i ≥ 0. Hence, we have
σlimitD ⊆ ClD(σ)
Furthermore, from the construction of Γi(σ), it follows that σlimit satisfies all static causal
laws in D. Because of the minimality property of ClD(σ), we have
ClD(σ) ⊆ σ
limit
D
Accordingly, we have
σlimitD = ClD(σ)
The following corollary follows immediately from the above lemma.
Corollary 6.1
For two sets of literals σ ⊆ σ′, ClD(σ) ⊆ ClD(σ′).
For an action a and a state s, let e(a, s) = ClD(E(a, s)). We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2
Let a be an action and s, s′ be states. Then, we have
ClD(E(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s
′)) = ClD(e(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s
′))
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Proof
Let γ = E(a, s)∪ (s∩s′) and γ′ = e(a, s)∪ (s∩s′). As γ ⊆ γ′, it follows from Corollary
6.1 that to prove this lemma, it suffices to prove that
ClD(γ
′) ⊆ ClD(γ)
It is easy to see that
γ′ = ClD(E(a, s)) ∪ (s ∩ s
′) ⊆ ClD(E(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s
′)) = ClD(γ)
Therefore, by Corollary 6.1, we have
ClD(γ
′) ⊆ ClD(ClD(γ)) = ClD(γ)
Proof done.
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 3
For every state s′ ∈ RescD(a, s), we have
s′ \ (e(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s′)) ⊆ pc(a, δ)
Proof
Let σ denote e(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s′). By Corollary 6.1, since e(a, δ) ⊆ e(a, s) ⊆ σ, we have
ClD(e(a, δ)) ⊆ ClD(σ) = s
′ (46)
We now show that, for every i ≥ 1,
Γi(σ) \ Γi−1(σ) ⊆ pci(a, δ) (47)
by induction on i.
1. Base case: i = 1. Let l be a literal in Γ1(σ) \ Γ0(σ). We need to prove that l ∈ pc1(a, δ).
By the definition of Γ, it follows that
l 6∈ Γ0(σ) = σ (48)
l ∈ Γ1(σ) ⊆ s′ (49)
and, in addition, there exists a static causal law
if(l, ϕ)
in D such that
ϕ ⊆ Γ0(σ) = σ (50)
By (48), we have l 6∈ (s∩ s′). By (49), we have l ∈ s′. Accordingly, we have l 6∈ s. On the
other hand, because δ ⊆ s, we have
l 6∈ δ (51)
It follows from (50) that ϕ ⊆ s′ since σ ⊆ s′. Because of the completeness of s′, we have
¬ϕ ∩ s′ = ∅. On the other hand, by (46), we have ClD(e(a, δ)) ⊆ s′. As a result, we have
¬ϕ ∩ ClD(e(a, δ)) = ∅ (52)
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We now show that ϕ 6⊆ s. Suppose otherwise, that is, ϕ ⊆ s. This implies that l ∈ s. By
(49), it follows that l ∈ (s ∩ s′) ⊆ σ and this is a contradiction to (48). Thus, ϕ 6⊆ s.
On the other hand, we know that ϕ ⊆ σ = e(a, s)∪ (s∩s′) and thus we have ϕ∩ (e(a, s)\
s) 6= ∅. In addition, it is easy to see that e(a, s) \ s ⊆ e(a, s) \ δ ⊆ pc0(a, δ). Therefore,
we have
ϕ ∩ pc0(a, δ) 6= ∅ (53)
From (51) – (53), and by the definition of pc1(a, δ), we can conclude that l ∈ pc1(a, δ).
The base case is thus true.
2. Inductive Step: Assume that (47) is true for all i ≤ k. We need to prove that it is true for
i = k + 1. Let l be a literal in Γk+1(σ) \ Γk(σ). We will show that l ∈ pck+1(a, δ).
By the definition of Γ, there exists a static causal law
if(l, ϕ)
in D such that
ϕ ⊆ Γk(σ) ⊆ s′ (54)
Because ϕ ⊂ s′, we have ¬ϕ ∩ s′ = ∅. In addition, by (46), ClD(e(a, δ)) is a subset of s′.
A a result, we have
¬ϕ ∩ ClD(e(a, δ)) = ∅ (55)
It is easy to see that ϕ 6⊆ Γk−1(σ) for if otherwise then, by the definition of Γ, l must be in
Γk(σ), which is impossible. In other words, there exists l′ ∈ ϕ such that l′ 6∈ Γk−1(σ) but
l′ ∈ Γk(σ). By the inductive hypothesis, we have l′ ∈ pck(a, δ), which implies that
ϕ ∩ pck(a, δ) 6= ∅ (56)
Because l 6∈ Γk(σ), we have l 6∈ σ. As a result, l 6∈ (s ∩ s′). On the other hand, since
l ∈ Γk+1(σ) ⊆ s′, it follows that l 6∈ s. Thus, we have
l 6∈ δ (57)
From (55) – (57), and by the definition of pck+1(a, δ), it follows that l ∈ pck+1(a, δ). So
the inductive step is proven.
As a result, it is always the case that (47) holds. Hence, we have
Γi(σ) \ σ ⊆
i⋃
j=0
(pcj(a, δ)) = pci(a, δ)
and thus,
∞⋃
i=0
(Γi(σ) \ σ) ⊆
∞⋃
i=0
pci(a, δ)
Accordingly, by Lemma (1) and by the definition of pc(a, δ), we have
(s′ \ σ) ⊆ pc(a, δ).
The lemma is thus true.
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We now prove Proposition 1. Let
γ = e(a, δ) ∪ (δ \ ¬pc(a, δ)) δ′ = ClD(γ)
Let s′ be some state in RescD(a, s). Such an s′ exists because D is consistent. By Lemma
2 and by Definition 2, we have
s′ = ClD(σ) (58)
where
σ = e(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s′)
To prove Proposition 1, it suffices to prove that δ′ ⊆ s′. But first of all, let us prove, by
induction, the following
Γi(γ) ⊆ s′ (59)
for every integer i ≥ 0.
1. Base Case: i = 0. Assume that l ∈ Γ0(γ) = γ. We need to show that l ∈ s′. There
are two possibilities for l ∈ γ.
a) l ∈ e(a, δ). It is easy to see that l ∈ s′ because
e(a, δ) ⊆ e(a, s) ⊆ σ ⊆ ClD(σ) = s
′.
b) l 6∈ e(a, δ), l ∈ δ, and ¬l 6∈ pc(a, δ). Since δ ⊆ s, we have l ∈ s. Because of
the completeness of s, it follows that ¬l 6∈ s. Accordingly, we have
¬l 6∈ (s ∩ s′) (60)
On the other hand, because ¬l 6∈ pc(a, δ), ¬l 6∈ s, and (e(a, s) \ s) ⊆
pc0(a, δ) ⊆ pc(a, δ), we have
¬l 6∈ e(a, s) (61)
From (60) and (61), it follows that ¬l 6∈ σ. In addition, since ¬l 6∈ pc(a, δ),
by Lemma 3, we have ¬l 6∈ s′ \ σ. Accordingly, we have ¬l 6∈ s′. Because s′
is complete, we can conclude that l ∈ s′.
2. Inductive Step: Assume that (59) is true for all i ≤ k. We need to show that
Γk+1(γ) ⊆ s′. Let l be a literal in Γk+1(γ). By the definition of Γk+1(γ), there are
two possibilities for l:
a) l ∈ Γk(γ). Clearly, in this case, we have l ∈ s′.
b) there exists a static causal law
if(l, ϕ)
in D such that ϕ ⊆ Γk(γ).
By the inductive hypothesis, we have ϕ ⊆ s′. Hence, l must hold in s′.
Therefore, in both cases, we have l ∈ s′. This implies that Γk+1(γ) ⊆ s′.
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As a result, (59) always holds. By Lemma 1, we have
δ′ =
∞⋃
i=0
Γi(γ) ⊆ s′
Since s′ is a state, δ′ is consistent. Thus, by the definition of the Res-function, we have
ResD(a, δ) = {δ
′}
Furthermore, δ′ ⊆ s′ for every s′ ∈ RescD(a, s).
The proposition is proven.
Proof of Proposition 2
Since δ is valid, there exists a state s such that δ ⊆ s.
On the other hand, we assume that in every state of the world, exactly one literal in θ
holds, there exists a literal g ∈ θ such that g holds in s and for all g′ ∈ θ \ {g}, g′ does not
hold in s.
Accordingly, we have δ ∪ {g} ⊆ s. By Corollary 6.1, we have δ′ = ClD(δ ∪ {g}) ⊆
ClD(s) = s. Hence, δ′ is consistent. By the definition of the Res−function, we have
δ′ ∈ ResD(a, δ). Since δ′ ⊆ s, δ′ is a valid a-state.
The proposition is thus true.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us prove this proposition by using structural induction on p.
1. p = []. Trivial.
2. p = [a; q], where q is a conditional plan and a is a non-sensing action.
Assume that Proposition 3 is true for q. We need to prove that it is also true for p.
Suppose Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥. Clearly we have Φ(a, δ) 6= ⊥.
Therefore, we have Φ(a, δ) = ResD(a, δ). On the other hand, since δ is a valid a-
state, it follows from Proposition 1 that ResD(a, δ) = {δ′} for some valid a-state
δ′.
As a result, we have Φˆ(q, δ′) contains at least one valid a-state. Hence, Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥
contains at least one valid a-state.
3. p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action that senses g1, . . . , gn.
Assume that Proposition 3 is true for pj’s. We need to prove that it is also true for p.
Because Φˆ(p, δ) 6= ⊥, we have Φ(a, δ) 6= ⊥. By the definition of the Φ-function, we
have Φ(a, δ) = ResD(a, δ). As δ is valid, by Proposition 2, ResD(a, δ) contains at
least one valid a-state δ′.
By the definition of the Res−function for sensing actions, we know that δ′ =
ClD(δ ∪ {gk}) for some k. This implies that gk holds in δ′.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have Φˆ(pk, δ′) contains at least one valid a-state.
By the definition of the Φˆ-function, we have Φˆ(pk, δ′) ⊆ Φˆ(p, δ). Thus, Φ(p, δ)
contains at least one valid a-state.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Let n denote the size of D. Because of Lemma 1, we can conclude that for any set of
literals σ, computing ClD(σ) can be done in polynomial time in n.
Observe that for a non-sensing action a and an a-state δ, computing e(a, δ) and pc(a, δ)
can be done in polynomial time in n. Thus, computing Φ(a, δ) can be done in polynomial
time in n.
Likewise, computing Φ(a, δ) for a sensing action a can also be done in polynomial time
in n.
Hence, Proposition 4 holds.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in (Baral et al. 2000a) which states that the
conditional planning problem with respect to the 0-approximation in (Son and Baral 2001)
is NP-complete. Membership follows from Corollary 2.1. Hardness follows from the fact
that the approximation proposed in this paper coincides with the 0-approximation in (Son and Baral 2001),
i.e, the conditional planning problem considered in this paper coincides with the planning
problem with limited-sensing in (Baral et al. 2000a) which is NP-complete. By the restric-
tion principle, we conclude that the problem considered in this paper is also NP-complete.
Appendix B – Proofs related to π
This section contain proofs related to the correctness of π. Before we present the proofs,
let us introduce some notations that will be used throughout the rest of the appendix. Given
a program Π, by lit(Π) we mean the set of atoms in Π. If Z is a splitting set for Π and Σ is
a set of atoms then by bZ(Π) and eZ(Π \ bZ(Π),Σ), we mean the bottom part of Π w.r.t.
Z and the evaluation of the top part w.r.t. (Z,Σ) (see (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) for more
information about these notions).
Lemma 4
1. Let Π be a logic program. Suppose Π can be divided into two disjoint subprograms
Π1 and Π2, i.e., Π = Π1 ∪ Π2 and lit(Π1) ∩ lit(Π2) = ∅. Then S is an answer set
for Π if and only if there exist two sets S1 and S2 of atoms such that S = S1 ∪ S2
and S1 and S2 are answer sets for Π1 and Π2 respectively.
2. The result in Item 1 can be generalized to n disjoint subprograms, where n is an
arbitrary integer.
Proof
The first item can easily proved by using the splitting set Z = lit(Π1). The second item
immediately follows from this result.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose we are given a planning problem instanceP = (D, I,G) and πh,w(P), where h ≥
1 and w ≥ 1 are some integers, returns an answer set S. The proof is primarily based on
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the splitting set and splitting sequence theorems described in (Lifschitz and Turner 1994).
It is organized as follows. We first prove a lemma related to the closure of a set of liter-
als (Lemma 5). Together with Lemma 4, this lemma is used to prove some properties of
πh,w(P) (Lemmas 6, 7 & 8). Based on these results, we prove the correctness of πh,w(P)
in implementing the Φ and Φˆ functions (Lemma 9 & Lemma 10). Theorem 2 can be derived
directly from Lemma 10.
Recall that we have made certain assumptions for action theories given to ASCP: (a) for
every k-proposition determines(a, η), η contains at least two elements; and (b) for every
static causal law if(f, φ), φ is not an empty set.
The following lemma shows a code fragment that correctly encodes the closure of a set
of literals.
Lemma 5
Let i and k be two integers greater than 0, and x be a 3-ary predicate. For any set σ of
literals, the following program
x(l, i, k)← (l ∈ σ)
x(l, i, k)← x(ϕ, i, k) (if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
has the unique answer set {x(l, i, k) | l ∈ ClD(σ)}.
Proof
By the definition of a model of a positive program, it is easy to see that the above program
has the unique answer set {x(l, i, k) | l ∈ σlimitD } = {x(l, i, k) | l ∈ ClD(σ)} (see Lemma
1).
Before showing some lemmas about the properties of πh,w(P), let us introduce some no-
tions and definitions that will be used throughout the rest of this section. We first define
some sets of atoms which will frequently be used in the proofs of Lemmas 6 – 10 and
Theorem 2. Then we divide the program πh,w(P) into small parts to simplify the proofs.
In particular, πh,w(P) is divided into two programs π∗h,w(P) and πch,w(P). The former
consists of normal logic program rules while the latter consists of constraints in πh,w(P).
Then we use the splitting set theorem to remove from π∗h,w(P) auxiliary atoms such as
fluent(. . .), literal(. . .), time(. . .), path(. . .), etc. The resulting program, denoted by
π0, consists of “main” atoms only. We then use the splitting sequence theorem to further
split π0 into a set of programs πi’s. Intuitively, each πi corresponds to a “cut” of π0 at
time point i. Finally, each πi is divided into disjoint subprograms πki ’s, each of which,
intuitively, is a “cut” of πi at a specific path.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h + 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ w, let Ai,k be the set of all the atoms of the form
occ(a, i, k), poss(a, i, k), used(i, k), goal(i, k), holds(l, i, k), br(g, i, k, k′) (k′ ≥ k),
e(l, i, k), pc(l, i, k), i.e.,
Ai,k = {occ(a, i, k), poss(a, i, k) | a ∈ A} ∪
{holds(l, i, k), e(l, i, k), pc(l, i, k) | l is a literal} ∪
{br(g, i, k, k′) | g is a sensed-literal, k ≤ k′ ≤ w} ∪
{used(i, k), goal(i, k)} (62)
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and let
Ai =
w⋃
k=1
Ai,k, A =
h+1⋃
i=1
Ai (63)
For a set of atoms Σ ⊆ A and a set of predicate symbols X , by ΣX we denote the set of
atoms in Σ whose predicate symbols are in X and by δi,k(Σ), we mean {l | holds(l, i, k) ∈
Σ}.
Observe that πh,w(P) can be divided into two parts (1) π∗h,w(P) consisting of normal
logic program rules, and (2) πch,w(P) consisting of constraints. Since S is an answer set
for πh,w(P)11, S is also an answer set for π∗h,w(P) and does not violate any constraint in
πch,w(P).
Let V be the set of atoms in πh,w(P) whose parameter list does not contain either the
time or path variable. Specifically, V is the following set of atoms
{fluent(f), literal(f), literal(¬f), contrary(f,¬f), contrary(¬f, f) | f ∈ F} ∪
{sensed(g) | ∃determines(a, θ) ∈ D.g ∈ θ} ∪ {action(a) | a ∈ A} ∪
{time(t) | t ∈ {1..h}} ∪ {time1(t) | t ∈ {1..h+ 1}} ∪ {path(p) | p ∈ {1..w}} (64)
It is easy to see that V is a splitting set for π∗h,w(P). Furthermore, the bottom part bV (π∗h,w(P))
is a positive program and has only one answer set X0 = V . The partial evaluation of the
top part of π∗h,w(P) with respect to X0,
π0 = eV (π
∗
h,w(P) \ bV (π
∗
h,w(P)), X0),
is the following set of rules (the condition for each rule follows that rule; and, by default t
and p are in ranges 1 . . . h and 1 . . . w unless otherwise specified):
holds(l, 1, 1) ← (65)
(initially(l) ∈ I)
poss(a, t, p) ← holds(ψ, t, p) (66)
(executable(a, ψ) ∈ D)
e(l, t, p) ← occ(a, t, p), holds(φ, t, p) (67)
(causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D)
pc(l, t, p) ← occ(a, t, p), not holds(l, t, p), not holds(φ, t, p) (68)
(causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D)
br(g, t, p, p) | . . .
| br(g, t, p, w) ← occ(a, t, p) (69)
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, t, p) ← not holds(l, t, p), pc(l′, t, p), not e(¬ϕ, t, p) (70)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, t, p) ← e(ϕ, t, p) (71)
11 Recall that at at the beginning of this section, we state that pih,w(P) returns S as an answer set.
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(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, t, p) ← holds(ϕ, t, p) (72)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, 1 ≤ t ≤ h+ 1)
goal(t, p) ← holds(G, t, p) (73)
(1 ≤ t ≤ h+ 1)
goal(t, p) ← holds(f, t, p), holds(¬f, t, p) (74)
(1 ≤ t ≤ h+ 1)
holds(l, t+1, p) ← e(l, t, p) (75)
holds(l, t+1, p) ← h(l, t, p), not pc(¬l, t, p) (76)
used(t+1, p) ← br(g, t, p1, p) (77)
(p1 < p)
holds(g, t+1, p) ← br(g, t, p1, p) (78)
(p1 ≤ p)
holds(l, t+1, p) ← br(g, t, p1, p), holds(l, t, p1) (79)
(p1 < p)
occ(a1, t, p) | . . .
occ(am, t, p) ← used(t, p), not goal(t, p) (80)
used(1, 1) ← (81)
used(t+1, p) ← used(t, p) (82)
And πch,w(P) is the following collection of constraints
← occ(a, t, p), not br(θ, t, p, p) (83)
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D)
← occ(a, t, p), br(g, t, p, p1), br(g, t, p, p2) (84)
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ, p ≤ p1 < p2)
← occ(a, t, p), holds(g, t, p) (85)
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
← used(h+1, p), not goal(h+1, p) (86)
← br(g1, t, p1, p), br(g2, t, p2, p) (87)
(p1 < p2 < p)
← br(g1, t, p1, p), br(g2, t, p1, p) (88)
(g1 6= g2, p1 ≤ p)
← br(g, t, p1, p), used(t, p) (89)
(p1 < p)
← used(t, p), not goal(t, p), occ(ai, t, p), occ(aj , t, p) (90)
(1 ≤ i < j ≤ m)
← occ(a, t, p), not poss(a, t, p) (91)
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Note that choice rules of the form
1{L1, . . . , Ln}1← Body
have been translated into
L1 | . . . | Ln ← Body
and
← Body, Li, Lj (1 ≤ i < j ≤ n)
By the splitting set theorem, there exists an answer set S0 for π0 such that S = S0∪X0.
Let Ui be the set of atoms in π0 whose time parameter is less than or equal to i, i.e.,
Ui =
i⋃
j=1
Aj (92)
It is easy to see that the sequence 〈Ui〉h+1i=1 is a splitting sequence for π0. By the splitting
sequence theorem, since S0 is an answer set for π0, there must be a sequence of sets of
literals 〈Xi〉h+1i=1 such that Xi ⊆ Ui \ Ui−1, and
• S0 =
⋃h+1
i=1 Xi
• X1 is an answer set for
π1 = bU1(π0) (93)
• for every 1 < i ≤ h+ 1, Xi is an answer set for
πi = eUi(bUi(π0) \ bUi−1(π0),
⋃
1≤t≤i−1
Xt) (94)
Given a set of atoms Σ, consider rules of the following forms:
holds(l, 1, 1) ← (95)
(initially(l) ∈ I)
poss(a, t, p) ← holds(ψ, t, p) (96)
(executable(a, ψ) ∈ D)
e(l, t, p) ← occ(a, t, p), holds(φ, t, p) (97)
(causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D)
pc(l, t, p) ← occ(a, t, p), not holds(l, t, p),
not holds(¬φ, t, p) (98)
(causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D)
br(g, t, k, p) | . . .
br(g, t, k, w) ← occ(a, t, p) (99)
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, t, p) ← not holds(l, t, p), pc(l′, t, p), not e(¬ϕ, t, p) (100)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, t, p) ← e(ϕ, t, p) (101)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
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holds(l, t, p) ← holds(ϕ, t, p) (102)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
goal(t, p) ← holds(G, t, p) (103)
goal(t, p) ← holds(f, t, p), holds(¬f, t, p) (104)
holds(l, t, p) ← (105)
(e(l, t−1, p) ∈ Σ)
holds(l, t, p) ← (106)
(holds(l, t−1, p) ∈ Σ, pc(¬l, t−1, p) 6∈ Σ)
used(t, p) ← (107)
(∃〈g, p′〉.p′ < p ∧ br(g, t−1, p′, p) ∈ Σ)
holds(g, t, p) ← (108)
(∃〈g, p′〉.p′ ≤ p ∧ br(g, t−1, p′, p) ∈ Σ)
holds(l, t, p) ← (109)
∃〈g, p′〉.p′ < p ∧ br(g, t−1, p′, p) ∈ Σ ∧
holds(l, t−1, p′) ∈ Σ)
occ(a1, t, p) | . . .
| occ(am, t, p) ← used(t, p), not goal(t, p) (110)
used(1, 1) ← (111)
used(t, p) ←
(used(t−1, p) ∈ Σ) (112)
Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , h + 1}, πi can be divided into w disjoint subprograms πki ,
1 ≤ k ≤ w, where πki is defined as follows
πki =


{(95)− (104), (110)− (111) | t = 1, p = 1} if i = 1, k = 1
{(96)− (104), (110) | t = 1, p = k} if i = 1, k > 1
{(96)− (110), (112) | t = i, p = k,Σ = Xi−1} if 1 < i ≤ h
{(102)− (109), (112) | t = h+ 1, p = k,Σ = Xh} otherwise
(113)
Let Xi,k denote Xi ∩ Ai,k. From Lemma 4, it follows that Xi,k is an answer set for πki .
Hence, we have
δi,k(S) = δi,k(S0) = δi,k(Xi) = δi,k(Xi,k)
Due to this fact, from now on, we will use δi,k to refer to either δi,k(S), δi,k(S0), δi,k(Xi),
or δi,k(Xi,k).
We have the following lemma
Lemma 6
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h+ 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ w,
1. if used(i, k) 6∈ S then S does not contain any atoms of the forms holds(l, i, k),
e(l, i, k), br(g, i, k, k);
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2. if used(h+ 1, k) ∈ S and δh+1,k is consistent then
δh+1,k |= G.
Proof
1. We will use induction on i to prove this item.
a. Base case: i = 1. Let k be an integer such that used(1, k) 6∈ S. Clearly we have
k > 1. On the other hand, it is easy to see that (by using the splitting set Z =
A
{holds,e,br,occ,goal,used}
1,k ) if k > 1 then S does not contain atoms of the forms
holds(l, 1, k), e(l, 1, k), and br(g, 1, k, k). Thus, the base case is true.
b. Inductive step: Assume that Item 1 is true for i ≤ j−1, where j > 1. We will prove
that it is also true for i = j. Let k be an integer such that used(j, k) 6∈ S.
Clearly, to prove Item 1 we only need to prove that atoms of the forms e(l, j, k),
holds(l, j, k), br(g, j, k, k) do not belong to Xj,k. Consider the program πkj (see
(113)). We know that Xj,k is an answer set for πkj .
Because of rule (112), we have used(j−1, k) 6∈ Xj−1. From (107), it follows that
br(g, j−1, k′, k) 6∈ Xj−1 for every pair 〈g, k′〉 such that k′ < k. In addition, by the
inductive hypothesis, we have that for any l and g, e(l, j−1, k), holds(l, j−1, k),
and br(g, j−1, k, k) are not in Xj−1. As a result, rules (105)-(109) do not exist in
πkj . If we split πkj by the set Z = A
{holds,e,br,occ,used,goal}
j,k then bZ(πkj ) is the set of
rules of the forms
i. (97), (99), (101)–(103), (110) if i ≤ h
ii. (102)–(103) if i = h+ 1
It is not difficult to show that this program has the empty set as its only answer set
(recall that G 6= ∅). From this, we can conclude the inductive step.
2. It is obvious because of the rules (73), (74) and the constraint (86).
Lemma 7
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h and 1 ≤ k ≤ w, if occ(a, i, k) ∈ S then a is executable in δi,k and there is
no b 6= a such that occ(b, i, k) ∈ S.
Proof
From constraint (91), it follows that poss(a, i, k) ∈ S. Notice only rules of the form (66)
may have poss(a, i, k) as its head. Hence, there must be a proposition (2) in D such that ψ
holds in δi,k. This means a is executable in δi,k.
If there exists b 6= a such that occ(b, i, k) ∈ S then constraint (90) could not be satisfied.
Lemma 8
for 1 ≤ i ≤ h and 1 ≤ k ≤ w
1. if occ(a, i, k) ∈ S and a is a non-sensing action then
a. e(l, i, k) ∈ S iff l ∈ e(a, δi,k)
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b. pc(l, i, k) ∈ S iff l ∈ pc(a, δi,k)
c. ¬∃〈g, k′〉.br(g, i, k′, k) ∈ S
2. if occ(a, i, k) ∈ S and a is a sensing action a with occurring in a k-proposition of the
form (5) in D and θ = {g1, . . . , gn} then there exist n distinct integers k1, . . . , kn
greater than or equal to k such that
a. X
{br}
i,k = {br(gj, i, k, kj) | j ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
b. gj does not hold in δi,k,
c. if kj > k then S does not contain any atoms of the form holds(l, i, kj)
3. if occ(a, i, k) 6∈ S for every action a then
a. ∀l.pc(l, i, k) 6∈ S ∧ e(l, i, k) 6∈ S
b. ∀〈g, k′〉.br(g, i, k, k′) 6∈ S
Proof
Let us split πki by the set Z1 = A
{used,goal,occ,holds,poss}
i,k . By the splitting set theorem,
Xi,k = M ∪ N where M is an answer set for bZ1(πki ) and N is an answer set for Π1 =
eZ1(π
k
i \ bZ1(π
k
i ),M), which consists of the following rules
e(l, i, k) ← (114)
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(φ, i, k) ⊆M)
pc(l, i, k) ← (115)
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M,holds(l, i, k) 6∈M,
causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D, holds(¬φ, i, k) ∩M = ∅)
br(g, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g, i, k, w) ← (116)
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k) (117)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k) (118)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
From the splitting set theorem, it follows that δi,k(M) = δi,k
1. Assume that occ(a, i, k) ∈ S and a is a non-sensing action. By Lemma 7, we know that
there exists no sensing action12 b such that occ(b, i, k) ∈ S. This means that rules of form
(116) does not exist. Therefore, Π1 can be rewritten to
e(l, i, k) ←
(causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D, holds(φ, i, k) ⊆M)
12 Recall that the sets of non-sensing actions and sensing actions are disjoint from each other. Hence, a itself is
not a sensing action.
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pc(l, i, k) ←
(holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(¬φ, i, k) ∩M = ∅)
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
If we continue splitting the above program using Z2 = A{e}i,k then by Lemma 5, the bottom
part has the only answer set
{e(l, i, k) | l ∈ e(a, δi,k)}
and the evaluation of the top part has the only answer set
{pc(l, i, k) | l ∈ pc(a, δi,k)}
Due to the fact that M does not contain any atoms of the form e(l, i, k) or pc(l, i, k), we
therefore can conclude Items (a) and (b).
We now show that ¬∃〈g, k′〉.br(g, i, k′, k) ∈ S. Suppose otherwise, i.e., there exists g
and k′ such that br(g, i, k′, k) ∈ S. Notice that only rule (80) with t = i and p = k has
occ(a, i, k) in its head. Hence, its body must be satisfied by S. That implies used(i, k) ∈ S.
On the other hand, since only rules of the form (69) with p = k′ may have br(g, i, k′, k) in
its head, there exists a sensing action b such that occ(b, i, k′) ∈ S and in addition, k′ ≤ k.
As the sets of non-sensing actions and sensing actions are disjoint from each other, we
have b 6= a. From Lemma 7, it follows that k′ < k.
Accordingly, we have used(i, k) ∈ S, br(g, i, k′, k) ∈ S and k′ < k. Constraint (89) with
t = i, p = k, and p1 = k′ is thus violated. Thus, Item (c) holds.
2. Assume that occ(a, i, k) ∈ S and a is a sensing action occurring in a k-proposition of the
form (5) in D withθ = {g1, . . . , gn}.
In this case, since rules of the forms (114) and (115) do not exist, Π1 is the following set
of rules
br(g1, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g1, i, k, w) ←
. . . . . . . . .
br(gn, i, k, k) | . . .
br(gn, i, k, w) ←
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
By further splitting the above program using the set A{e,pc}i,k , we will see that the bottom
part has the empty set as its only answer set (recall that we are assuming that the body
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of each static law of the form (4) is not empty). Therefore, the answer set for the above
program is also the answer set for the following program and vice versa.
br(g1, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g1, i, k, w) ←
. . . . . . . . .
br(gn, i, k, k) | . . .
br(gn, i, k, w) ←
Thus, there exist n integers k1, . . ., kn greater than or equal to k such that
N =
n⋃
j=1
{br(gj , i, k, kj)}
It is easy to see that X{br}i,k = N{br}. In addition, by constraints of the form (88), kj’s must
be distinct. Thus, Items (a) is true.
Item (b) can be drawn from constraints of the form (85).
Assume kj > k. Because of constraints of the form (89), we have used(i, kj) 6∈ S. From
Lemma 6, it follows that S does not contain any atoms of the form holds(l, i, kj). Item (c)
is thus true.
3. occ(a, i, k) 6∈ S for every action a. In this case, Π1 is the following set of rules
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
which has an empty set as its only answer set. Items (a)–(b) follow from this.
The following lemma shows that πh,w(P) correctly implements the transition function Φ.
Lemma 9
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h and 1 ≤ k ≤ w
1. if there exists a non-sensing action a such that occ(a, i, k) ∈ S then
Φ(a, δi,k) =
{
∅ if δi+1,k is inconsistent
{δi+1,k} otherwise
;
2. if there exists a sensing action a occurring in a k-proposition of the form (5) inD with
θ = {g1, . . . , gn} such that occ(a, i, k) ∈ S then there exist n integers {k1, . . . , kn}
such that
Φ(a, δi,k) = {δi+1,kj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, δi+1,kj is consistent},
and for each j, gj holds in δi+1,kj ;
3. if occ(a, i, k) 6∈ S for every action a,
δi+1,k = δi,k.
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Proof
1. Assume that there exists a non-sensing action a such that occ(a, i, k) ∈ Xi.
Observe that Z1 = A{holds}i+1,k is a splitting set for πki+1. Hence, by the splitting set theorem,
Xi+1,k = M ∪ N , where M ⊆ Z1 is an answer set for Π1 = bZ1(πki+1) and N is an
answer set for Π2 = eZ1(πki+1 \Π1,M).
Notice that by Lemma 8, rules (108)–(109) for t = i + 1, p = k do not exist. Thus, Π1 is
the following set of rules:
holds(l, i+1, k) ← holds(ϕ, i+1, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i+1, k) ←
(e(l, i, k) ∈ Xi)
holds(l, i+1, k) ←
(holds(l, i, k) ∈ Xi, pc(¬l, i, k) 6∈ Xi)
Also by Lemma 8, the conditions for the second and third rules can be written as (l ∈
e(a, δi,k)) and (l ∈ δi,k,¬l 6∈ pc(a, δi,k)) respectively. Thus, by Lemma 5, Π1 has the
unique answer set
M = {holds(l, i+1, k) | l ∈ ClD(a, δi,k)}
On the other hand, by Lemma 7, a is executable in δi,k. From the definition of the ResD
and Φ functions, it follows that
Φ(a, δi,k) =
{
∅ if δi+1,k is inconsistent
{δi+1,k} otherwise
2. Assume that there exists a sensing action a with a k-proposition of the form (5) and θ =
{g1, . . . , gn} such that occ(a, i, k) ∈ S.
By Lemma 8, for each j ∈ {1 . . . n}, there exists kj ≥ k such that br(gj , i, k, kj) ∈ Xi.
It is easy to see that Z2 = A{holds}i+1,kj is a splitting set for π
kj
i+1. Considering cases kj = k
and kj > k in turn and observe that holds(l, i, kj) 6∈ S if kj > k, we will see that in both
cases bZ2(π
kj
i+1) is the following set of rules:
holds(l, i+1, kj) ← holds(ϕ, i+1, kj)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i+1, kj) ←
(holds(l, i, k) ∈ Xi)
holds(gj , i+1, kj) ←
By Lemma 5, the only answer set for the above program is
M = {holds(l, i+ 1, kj) | l ∈ ClD(δi,k ∪ {gj})}
On the other hand, by Lemma 7, a is executable in δi,k and by Lemma 8, gj does not hold
in δi,k. Thus, according to the definition of the transition function, we have
Φ(a, δi,k) = {ClD(δi,k ∪ {gj}) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n,ClD(δi,k ∪ {gj}) is consistent}
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Hence, we have
Φ(a, δi,k) = {δi+1,kj (M) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, δi+1,kj (M) is consistent} =
{δi+1,kj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, δi+1,kj is consistent}
and obviously, gj holds in δi+1,kj .
3. Assume that occ(a, i, k) 6∈ S for every action a.
Similar to the first case, Z1 is a splitting set for πki+1. bZ1(πki+1) is the following set of
rules:
holds(l, i+1, k) ← holds(ϕ, i+1, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i+1, k) ←
(holds(l, i, k) ∈ Xi)
Because that δi,k is an a-state (Lemma 6), by Lemma 5 the only answer set for this program
is
M = {holds(l, i+ 1, k) | l ∈ δi,k}
Thus, we have
δi+1,k = δi+1,k(M) = δi,k
The following lemma shows that πh,w(P) correctly implements the extended transition
function.
Lemma 10
We have
1. δ1,1 is the initial a-state for P .
2. For every pair of integers 1 ≤ i ≤ h+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ w, if used(i, k) ∈ S then
a) pki (S) is a conditional plan
b) furthermore, if δi,k is consistent then for every δ ∈ Φˆ(pki (S), δi,k), δ |= G.
Proof
1. Z1 = A{holds}1,1 is a splitting set for π11 . The bottom part, bZ1(π11), consists of the following
rules:
holds(l, 1, 1) ←
{initially(l) ∈ I}
holds(l, 1, 1) ← holds(ϕ, 1, 1)
{if(l, ϕ) ∈ D}
By Lemma 5, the only answer set for the above program is
M = {holds(l, 1, 1) | l ∈ δ1}
where δ1 is the initial a-state of P . Thus, δ1,1 = δ1,1(M) is the initial a-state of P .
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2. We now prove Item 2 by induction on parameter i.
a. Base case: i = h+1. Let k be an arbitrary integer between 1 and w such that
used(i, k) ∈ S. Clearly pki (S) = [] is a conditional plan.
Now suppose that δi,k is consistent. According to the definition of the extended
transition function, we have
Φˆ(pki (S), δi,k) = Φˆ([], δi,k) = {δi,k}
On the other hand, by Lemma 6, we have that δi,k |= G. Thus, Item 2 is true for
i = h+1.
b. Inductive step: Assume that Item 2 is true for all h+ 1 ≥ i > t. We will show that
it is true for i = t. Let k be an integer between 1 and w such that used(t, k) ∈ S.
Consider three possibilities:
i. occ(a, t, k) ∈ S for some non-sensing action a. By the definition of pkt (S), we
have pkt (S) = [a; pkt+1(S)]. In addition, by rule (82) we have used(t+1, k) ∈
S. Thus, according to the inductive hypothesis, pkt+1(S) is a conditional plan.
Accordingly, pkt (S) is also a conditional plan.
Now suppose that δt,k is consistent. Consider two cases
– δt+1,k is consistent. We have
Φˆ(pkt (S), δt,k) = Φˆ([a; p
k
t+1(S)], δt,k) = Φˆ(p
k
t+1(S), δt+1,k)
(by Lemma 9 and by the definition of the extended transition function).
On the other hand, according to the inductive hypothesis, for every δ in
Φˆ(pkt+1(S), δt+1,k), δ |= G. Hence, the inductive step is proven.
– δt+1,k is inconsistent. By Lemma 9, we have Φˆ(pkt (S), δt,k) = ∅. Thus, the
inductive step is proven.
ii. occ(a, t, k) ∈ S for some sensing action a with a k-proposition of the form (5)
and θ = {g1, . . . , gn}. By Lemma 8 there exist exactly n integers k1, . . . , kn
greater than k such that br(gj , t, k, kj) ∈ S for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This implies that
used(t+ 1, kj) ∈ S (see rules (77) and (82)). Thus, by the definition of pkt (S),
we have pkt (S) = [a; cases({gj → p
kj
i+1(S)}
n
j=1)]. On the other hand, we know
by the inductive hypothesis that pkji+1(S) is a conditional plan for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. As
a result, pkt (S) is also a conditional plan.
Suppose δi,k is consistent. Let J = {j | δt+1,kj is consistent}. By Lemma 9, we
have
Φ(a, δt,k) = {δt+1,kj | j ∈ J}
and gj holds in δt+1,kj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Hence, by the definition of Φˆ, we
have
Φˆ(pkt (S), δt,k) =
⋃
j∈J
Φˆ(pkt+1(S), δt+1,kj )
According to the inductive hypothesis, for every δ ∈ Φˆ(pkt+1(S), δt+1,kj ), where
j ∈ J , we have δ |= G. This implies that for every δ ∈ Φˆ(pkt (S), δt,k), we have
δ |= G.
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iii. There is no action a such that occ(a, t, k) ∈ S. According to the definition of
pkt (S), p
k
t (S) = []. Hence, it is a conditional plan.
It is easy to see that goal(t, k) ∈ S, which means that either δt,k is inconsistent
or δt,k |= G (see rules (73), (74), and (80)). Now suppose that δt,k is consistent.
This implies that δt,k |= G. We have
Φˆ(pkt (S), δt,k) = Φˆ([], δt,k) = {δt,k}
Thus, the inductive step is proven.
Theorem 2 immediately follows from Lemma 10.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 11
Let P = (D, I,G) be a planning problem instance, δ be an a-state and p be a plan. If
Φˆ(p, δ) |= G then Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G.
Proof
Let us prove the lemma by structural induction on p.
1. p = [].
The proof is trivial since reductδ(p) = p = [].
2. Assume that p = [a; q], where q is a conditional plan and a is a non-sensing action and
the lemma is true for q.
Suppose Φˆ(p, δ) |= G. We need to show that Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G.
If δ |= G then
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) = Φˆ([], δ) = {δ} |= G
Now consider the case that δ 6|= G.
Clearly, we have Φ(a, δ) 6= ⊥. Therefore, Φ(a, δ) = {δ′} for some δ′. Hence, by the
definition of reduct, we have
reductδ(p) = a; reductδ′(q)
Thus,
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) = Φˆ(reductδ′(q), δ
′)
On the other hand, we have
Φˆ(p, δ) = Φˆ(q, δ′)
Because Φˆ(p, δ) |= G, we have
Φˆ(q, δ′) |= G
By inductive hypothesis, we have
Φˆ(reductδ′(q), δ
′) |= G
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Hence,
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G
3. Assume that p = [a; cases({gj → pj}nj=1)], where a is a sensing action that senses
g1, . . . , gn, and the lemma for pj’s.
Suppose Φˆ(p, δ) |= G. We need to show that Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G.
If δ |= G then
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) = Φˆ([], δ) = {δ} |= G
Now consider the case that δ 6|= G. There are two possibilities.
a) there exists gk such that gk ∈ δ. By the definition of reduct, we have
reductδ(p) = reductδ(pk)
By the definition of the Φˆ-function, it is easy to see that
Φˆ(p, δ) = Φˆ(pk, δ)
Since Φˆ(p, δ) |= G, we have Φˆ(pk, δ) |= G. By the inductive hypothesis, we have
Φˆ(reductδ(pk), δ) |= G
Hence, we have
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G
a) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, gj 6∈ δ. By the definition of reduct, we have
reductδ(p) = a; cases({gj → qj}
n
j=1)
where
qj =
{
[] if ClD(δ ∪ {gj}) is inconsistent
reductClD(δ∪{gj})(pj) otherwise
For every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let δj = ClD(δ ∪ {gj}). Let J = {j | δj is consistent}. It is
easy to see that
Φˆ(p, δ) =
⋃
j∈J
Φ(pj , δj)
because gj holds in δj but for every k 6= j, gk does not hold in δj .
Because Φˆ(p, δ) |= G, we have
Φ(pj , δj) |= G
for every j ∈ J .
On the other hand, we have
qj =
{
[] if j 6∈ J
reductδj (pj) otherwise
Thus,
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) =
⋃
j∈J
Φ(qj , δj) =
⋃
j∈J
Φ(reductδj (pj), δj)
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By the inductive hypothesis, for every j ∈ J , asΦ(pj , δj) |= G, we haveΦ(reductδj (pj), δj) |=
G. As a result, we have
Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G
We now prove Proposition 5. Let p be a solution to P . From the construction of reduct,
it is easy to see that reductδ(p) is unique.
By Lemma 11, we have that Φˆ(reductδ(p), δ) |= G. Thus, reductδ(p) is also a solution
to P .
So, we can conclude the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 3
The idea of the proof is as follows. Let q be reductδ(p), where δ is the initial a-state of
P , and let Tq be the labeled tree for q numbered according to the principles described in
Section 3. Let h and w denote the height and width of Tq respectively. For 1 ≤ i ≤ h+ 1,
1 ≤ k ≤ w, we define δi,k to be the a-state at node (i, k)13 of Tq if such a node exists and
⊥ otherwise. Based on Tq and δi,k, we construct the set Yi,k of atoms that hold at node
(i, k). Then we prove that the union of these sets, denoted by S′0, is an answer set for π0
(rules (65)-(82)) by showing that each Yi,k is an answer set for a part of π0, denoted by
π′
k
i . Furthermore, a set S′ can be constructed from S′0 in such a way that it is an answer set
for π∗h,w(P). Moreover, S′ does not violate any constraints in πch,w (rules (83)-(91)). As
such, it is an answer set for πh,w(P). Moreover, q = p11(S′).
Given the numbered tree Tq, by 〈a, i, k〉we mean the node labeled with a and numbered
with (i, k) in Tq; by 〈g, i, k, k′〉 ∈ Tq we mean the link, whose label is g, between the
nodes (i, k) and (i + 1, k′) in Tq.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h+ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ w, we define the a-state δi,k as follows.
i. if i = 1
δi,k =
{
ClD({l | initially(l) ∈ I}) if k = 1
⊥ if k > 1 (119)
ii. if i > 1
δi,k =


ClD(e(a, δi−1,k) ∪ (δi−1,k \ pc(a, δi−1,k))) if 〈a, i−1, k〉 ∈ Tq for
a non-sensing action a
ClD(δi−1,k′ ∪ {g}) if 〈g, i−1, k′, k〉 ∈ Tq
δi−1,k otherwise
(120)
Note that given (i, k), there exists at most one action a such that 〈a, i−1, k〉 ∈ Tq, and fur-
thermore, at most one pair 〈g, k′〉 such that 〈g, i−1, k′, k〉 ∈ Tq . In addition, the conditions
in Equation (120) do not overlap each other. Thus, δi,k is uniquely defined for 1 ≤ i ≤ h+1
and 1 ≤ k ≤ w. In what follows, the undefined situation ⊥ can sometimes be thought of
as ∅, depending the context in which it is used.
Let us construct the set Yi,k of atoms based on δi,k as follows.
13 That is, the node numbered with (i, k) in Tq
ASP with Sensing Actions, Incomplete Information, and Static Causal Laws 57
1. used(1, 1) ∈ Y1,1
2. holds(l, i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif l ∈ δi,k
3. poss(a, i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif there exists a proposition of the form (2) s.t. ψ ⊆ δi,k
4. occ(a, i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq
5. br(g, i, k, k′) ∈ Yi,k iif 〈g, i, k, k′〉 ∈ Tq for some g, k′
6. e(l, i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq and l ∈ e(a, δi,k) for some non-sensing action a
7. pc(l, i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq and l ∈ pc(a, δi,k) for some non-sensing action a
8. For i > 1, used(i, k) ∈ Yi,k iif either
(a) used(i−1, k) ∈ Yi−1,k; or
(b) there exists 〈g, k′〉 s.t. 〈g, i−1, k′, k〉 ∈ Yi−1,k′
9. goal(i, k) ∈ Yi,k iff δi,k |= G or δi,k is inconsistent
10. Nothing else in Yi,k
Clearly, Yi,k’s are uniquely defined. Furthermore, they are disjoint from each other. Let
Yi =
w⋃
k=1
Yi,k and S′0 =
h+1⋃
i=1
Yi
Lemma 12
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h and 1 ≤ k ≤ w, let M = Y {holds,poss,goal,used,occ}i,k and let Π be the
following program:
e(l, i, k) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D, holds(φ, i, k) ⊆M)
pc(l, i, k) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(l, i, k) 6∈M,holds(¬φ, i, k) ∩M = ∅)
br(g, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g, i, k, w) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
Then, N = Y {e,pc,br}i,k is an answer set for Π.
Proof
Given (i, k), there are three cases that may happen at node (i, k).
• there exists a non-sensing action a such that 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq;
• there exists a sensing action a such that 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq;
• 〈a, i, k〉 6∈ Tq for every action a
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Let us consider each of those in turn.
1. there exists a non-sensing action a such that 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq .
From the construction of Yi,k, we know that occ(a, i, k) ∈ M and there is no b 6= a such
that occ(b, i, k) ∈ M . Furthermore, due to the fact that N does not contain any atom of
the form holds(l, i, k), we have holds(l, i, k) ∈ M iff holds(l, i, k) ∈ Yi,k. That means
holds(l, i, k) ∈M iff l ∈ δi,k.
Hence, Π can be rewritten to:
e(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ e(a, δi,k))
pc(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ pc0(a, δi,k))
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, l 6∈ δi,k, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
As have been seen in the proof of Theorem 2 (see the proof of Lemma 8, Item 1), the only
answer set for this program is {e(l, i, k) | l ∈ e(a, δi,k)} ∪ {pc(l, i, k) | l ∈ pc(a, δi,k)} =
N .
2. there exists a sensing action a such that 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq.
We have occ(a, i, k) ∈M and there is no non-sensing action b such that occ(b, i, k) ∈M .
As a result, Π is
br(g, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g, i, k, w) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
It is easy that an answer set for Π is also an answer set for
br(g, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g, i, k, w) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
and vice versa. On the other hand,
N = Y
{e,pc,br}
i,k = {br(g, i, k, k
′) | 〈g, i, k, k′〉 ∈ Tq}
is an answer set for the latter program. As a result, N is also an answer set for Π.
3. 〈a, i, k〉 6∈ Tq for every action a.
In this case, the first three rules of Π do not exist because occ(a, i, k) 6∈ M for every a.
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Thus, Π consists of the last two rules only. It is easy to see that it has the empty set as its
only answer set. On the other hand, from the construction of Yi,k, we have Y {e,pc,br}i,k = ∅.
Accordingly, Y {e,pc,br}i,k is an answer set for Π.
The proof is done.
Lemma 13
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h + 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ w, Yi,k is an answer set for π′ki , where π′
k
i is defined in the
same way as πki except that we replace every occurrence of X in Equation (113) by Y .
Proof
Let us consider in turn two cases i = 1 and i > 1.
1. i = 1. It is easy to see that the only answer set for π′k1 , where k > 1, is
Y1,k = {poss(a, 1, k) | executable(a, ∅) ∈ D}
by using the splitting set A{holds,occ,br,used,e,pc}1,k (see (62) for the definition of Ai,k) and
observe that the bottom part has the empty set as its only answer set and Y1,k is the only
answer set for the evaluation of the top part.
We now prove that Y1,1 is an answer set for π′11 which consists of the rules of the forms
(95)-(104), (110)-(111) where t = 1 and p = 1. If we use the setZ1 = A{holds,occ,poss,goal,used}1,1
to split π′11 then bZ1(π′
1
1) is
{(95)− (96), (102)− (104), (110), (111) | t = 1, p = 1}
From the definition of Y1,1, we can easily show that M = Y {holds,occ,poss,goal,used}1,1 is an
answer set for bZ1(π′
1
1). Furthermore, we have
δ1,1(M) = δ1,1(Y1,1) = δ1,1
The evaluation of the top part, Π1 = eZ1(π′
1
1 \ bZ1(π
′1
1),M), is the following set of rules
e(l, 1, 1) ←
(occ(a, 1, 1) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(φ, 1, 1) ⊆M)
pc(l, 1, 1) ←
(occ(a, 1, 1) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(l, 1, 1) 6∈M,holds(¬φ, 1, 1) ∩M = ∅)
br(g, 1, 1, k) | . . .
br(g, 1, 1, w) ←
(determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ, occ(a, 1, 1) ∈M)
pc(l, 1, 1) ← pc(l′, 1, 1), not e(¬ϕ, 1, 1)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, l′ ∈ ϕ, holds(l, 1, 1) 6∈M)
e(l, 1, 1) ← e(ϕ, 1, 1)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
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By Lemma 12, N = Y {e,pc,br}1,1 is an answer set for Π1. As a result, Y1,1 = M ∪N is an
answer set for π′11.
2. 1 < i ≤ h+ 1.
Using the splitting set Z2 = A{holds,occ,goal,used,poss}i,k to split π′
k
i , we have that the bottom
part Π2 = bZ2(π′
k
i ) consists of rules of the forms
• (96), (102)–(110), and (112) if i ≤ h
• (102)–(109), and (112) if i = h+ 1
We now prove that M = Y {holds,occ,goal,used,poss}i,k is an answer set for Π2. Let us further
split Π2 by the set Z3 = A{holds}i,k . Then, the bottom part bZ3(Π2) consists of rules of the
forms (102), (105)–(106), (108)–(109) only.
Consider three cases
a. there exists a non-sensing action a such that occ(a, i−1, k) ∈ Yi−1.
From the construction of Yi,k’s, it is easy to see that there exists no 〈g, k′〉 such that
br(g, i−1, k′, k) ∈ Yi−1. Thus, bZ3(Π2) contains rules of the forms (102), (105)–
(106) only. On the other hand, we have
e(l, i−1, k) ∈ Yi−1 iff l ∈ e(a, δi−1,k)
pc(¬l, i−1, k) 6∈ Yi−1 iff ¬l 6∈ pc(a, δi−1,k)
Hence, bZ3(Π2) is the following collection of rules:
holds(l, i, k) ← holds(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ e(a, δi−1,k))
holds(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ δi−1,k,¬l 6∈ δi−1,k)
By Lemma 5, it has the only answer set
{holds(l, i, k) | l ∈ ClD(e(a, δi−1,k) ∪ (δi−1,k \ pc(a, δi−1,k)))} = Y
{holds}
i,k
b. ∃〈g, k′〉.br(g, i−1, k′, k) ∈ Yi−1.
From the construction of Y ′i,ks, such 〈g, k′〉 is unique and in addition k′ ≤ k. Thus,
bZ3(Π2) is
holds(l, i, k) ← holds(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i, k) ←
((l ∈ δi−1,k) ∨ (k
′ < k ∧ l ∈ δi−1,k′))
holds(g, i, k) ←
or equivalently,
holds(l, i, k) ← holds(ϕ, i, k)
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(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ δi−1,k′ ∪ {g})
since if k′ < k then δi−1,k = ∅. By Lemma 5, this program has the only answer set
{holds(l, i, k) | l ∈ ClD(δi−1,k′ ∪ {g})} = {holds(l, i, k) | l ∈ δi,k}
Hence, Y {holds}i,k is the only answer set for bZ3(Π2).
c. occ(a, i−1, k) 6∈ Yi−1 for every non-sensing action a and ∀〈g, k′〉.br(g, i−1, k′, k) 6∈
Yi−1.
From the construction of Yi,k’s, it follows that e(l, i−1, k) 6∈ Yi−1 and pc(l, i−1, k) 6∈
Yi−1 for every l. Hence, bZ3(Π2) is the following set of rules
holds(l, i, k) ← holds(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
holds(l, i, k) ←
(l ∈ δi−1,k)
whose only answer set is
{holds(l, i, k) | l ∈ δi−1,k} = {holds(l, i, k) | l ∈ δi,k} = Y
{holds}
i,k
So, in all three cases, we have Y {holds}i,k is an answer set for bZ3(Π2).
Hence, Π3 = eZ3(Π2 \ bZ3(Π2), Y
{holds}
i,k ) is the following set of rules:
poss(a, i, k) ←
(executable(a, ψ) ∈ D, ψ ⊆ δi,k)
used(i, k) ←
(∃〈g, k′〉.k′ < k, br(g, i−1, k′, k) ∈ Yi−1)
goal(i, k) ←
(G ⊆ δi,k)
goal(i, k) ←
(δi,k is inconsistent)
occ(a1, i, k) | . . .
| occ(am, i, k) ← used(i, k), not goal(i, k)
used(i, k) ←
(used(i−1, k) ∈ Yi−1)
It is easy to see that Y {poss,used,goal,occ}i,k is an answer set for Π3. Accordingly, we have
M = Y
{holds,poss,used,goal,occ}
i,k is an answer set for Π2.
Π4 = eZ2(π
′k
i \Π2,M) is thus the following set of rules:
e(l, i, k) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D, holds(φ, i, k) ⊆M)
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pc(l, i, k) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, causes(a, l, φ) ∈ D,
holds(l, i, k) 6∈M,holds(¬φ, i, k) ∩M = ∅)
br(g, i, k, k) | . . .
br(g, i, k, w) ←
(occ(a, i, k) ∈M, determines(a, θ) ∈ D, g ∈ θ)
pc(l, i, k) ← pc(l′, i, k), not e(¬ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D, holds(l, i, k) 6∈M, l′ ∈ ϕ)
e(l, i, k) ← e(ϕ, i, k)
(if(l, ϕ) ∈ D)
By Lemma 12, N = Y {e,pc,br}i,k is an answer set for Π4.
As a result, Yi,k =M ∪N is an answer set for π′ki .
Lemma 14
We have
1. S′ =
⋃h+1
i=1 Yi ∪X0 is an answer set for πh,w(D), where X0 = V is defined in (64).
2. p11(S′) = q
Proof
1. Since Yi,k is an answer set for π′ki and π′
k
i ’s are disjoint from each other, we have Yi is an
answer set for π′i, where π′i is defined in the same way as πi except that every occurrence
ofX in Equations (93) and (94) is replaced with Y . From the splitting sequence theorem, it
follows that S′0 =
⋃h+1
i=1 Yi is an answer set for π0. Thus, S′ is an answer set for π∗h,w(P).
On the other hand, it is not difficult to show that S′ satisfies all constraints in π∗h,w(P)
based on the following observations.
• If occ(a, i, k) ∈ Yi,k for some sensing action a which occurs in a k-proposition of
the form (5) then there exists g in θ such that br(g, i, k, k) ∈ Yi,k. Furthermore, for
every g′ ∈ θ, g′ does not in δi,k. The latter property holds because that q does not
contain an action that senses an already known-to-be-true literal.
• If used(h+ 1, k) ∈ Yh+1,k then δh+1,k |= G.
• δi,k is either ⊥ or an a-state. This means that Y {holds}i,k does not contain two atoms
of the forms holds(l, i, k) and holds(l′, i, k), where l and l′ are contrary literals.
• No two branches come to the same node (i, k).
• If used(i, k) ∈ Yi then br(g, i, k′, k) 6∈ Yi for any pair 〈g, k′〉, k′ 6= k.
• if 〈a, i, k〉 ∈ Tq then a must be executable in δi,k.
Accordingly, we have S is an answer set for πh,w(P).
2. Immediate from the construction of Yi,k.
Theorem 3 follows directly from this lemma.
ASP with Sensing Actions, Incomplete Information, and Static Causal Laws 63
Appendix C – A Sample Encoding
This appendix contains the encoding of the planning problem P1 in Example 2. The first
subsection describes the input planning problem. The next subsection presents the corre-
sponding logic program πh,w(P1). The last two subsections are the outputs of smodels
and cmodelswhen this logic program is run with the parameters h = 2 and w = 3.
Input Domain
% A possible plan is
% check; cases(open-> [];closed->[flip_lock];locked->[])
% fluents
fluent(open).
fluent(closed).
fluent(locked).
% actions
action(check).
action(push_up).
action(push_down).
action(flip_lock).
% executability conditions
executable(check,[]).
executable(push_up,[closed]).
executable(push_down,[open]).
executable(flip_lock,[neg(open)]).
% dynamic laws
causes(push_down,closed,[]).
causes(push_up,open,[]).
causes(flip_lock,locked,[closed]).
causes(flip_lock,closed,[locked]).
% knowledge laws
determines(check,[open,closed,locked]).
% static laws
oneof([open,closed,locked]).
% initial state
initially(neg(open)). % window is not open
% goal
goal(locked). % window is locked
Encoding
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Usage:
% lparse -c h=<height> -c w=<width> | smodels
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
64 Phan Huy Tu, Tran Cao Son, and Chitta Baral
#domain fluent(F).
#domain literal(L;L1).
#domain sense(G;G1;G2).
#domain time(T).
#domain time1(T1).
#domain path(P;P1;P2).
#domain action(A).
% Input parameters
time(1..h).
time1(1..h+1).
path(1..w).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Action declarations
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
action(check).
action(push_up).
action(push_down).
action(flip_lock).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Fluent declarations
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fluent(open).
fluent(closed).
fluent(locked).
sense(open).
sense(closed).
sense(locked).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% DOMAIN DEPENDENT RULES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Initial situation
holds(neg(open),1,1).
% Executability conditions
poss(check,T,P).
poss(push_up,T,P) :-
holds(closed,T,P).
poss(push_down,T,P) :-
holds(open,T,P).
poss(flip_lock,T,P) :-
holds(neg(open),T,P).
% Effects of non-sensing actions
e(closed,T+1,P) :-
occ(push_down,T,P).
pc(closed,T+1,P) :-
occ(push_down,T,P).
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e(open,T+1,P) :-
occ(push_up,T,P).
pc(open,T+1,P) :-
occ(push_up,T,P).
e(locked,T+1,P) :-
occ(flip_lock,T,P),
holds(closed,T,P).
pc(locked,T+1,P) :-
occ(flip_lock,T,P),
not holds(neg(closed),T,P).
e(closed,T+1,P) :-
occ(flip_lock,T,P),
holds(locked,T,P).
pc(closed,T+1,P) :-
occ(flip_lock,T,P),
not holds(neg(locked),T,P).
% Effects of sensing actions
:- occ(check,T,P),
not br(open,T,P,P),
not br(closed,T,P,P),
not br(locked,T,P,P).
1{br(open,T,P,X):new_br(P,X)}1 :-
occ(check,T,P).
1{br(closed,T,P,X):new_br(P,X)}1 :-
occ(check,T,P).
1{br(locked,T,P,X):new_br(P,X)}1 :-
occ(check,T,P).
:- occ(check,T,P),
holds(open,T,P).
:- occ(check,T,P),
holds(closed,T,P).
:- occ(check,T,P),
holds(locked,T,P).
% Static laws
holds(neg(open),T1,P) :-
holds(closed,T1,P).
e(neg(open),T+1,P) :-
e(closed,T+1,P).
pc(neg(open),T+1,P) :-
pc(closed,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(open),T,P),
not e(neg(closed),T+1,P).
holds(neg(open),T1,P) :-
holds(locked,T1,P).
e(neg(open),T+1,P) :-
e(locked,T+1,P).
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pc(neg(open),T+1,P) :-
pc(locked,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(open),T,P),
not e(neg(locked),T+1,P).
holds(open,T1,P) :-
holds(neg(closed),T1,P),
holds(neg(locked),T1,P).
e(open,T+1,P) :-
e(neg(closed),T+1,P),
e(neg(locked),T+1,P).
pc(open,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(closed),T+1,P),
not holds(open,T,P),
not e(closed,T+1,P),
not e(locked,T+1,P).
pc(open,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(locked),T+1,P),
not holds(open,T,P),
not e(closed,T+1,P),
not e(locked,T+1,P).
holds(neg(closed),T1,P) :-
holds(open,T1,P).
e(neg(closed),T+1,P) :-
e(open,T+1,P).
pc(neg(closed),T+1,P) :-
pc(open,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(closed),T,P),
not e(neg(open),T+1,P).
holds(neg(closed),T1,P) :-
holds(locked,T1,P).
e(neg(closed),T+1,P) :-
e(locked,T+1,P).
pc(neg(closed),T+1,P) :-
pc(locked,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(closed),T,P),
not e(neg(locked),T+1,P).
holds(closed,T1,P) :-
holds(neg(open),T1,P),
holds(neg(locked),T1,P).
e(closed,T+1,P) :-
e(neg(open),T+1,P),
e(neg(locked),T+1,P).
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pc(closed,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(open),T+1,P),
not holds(closed,T,P),
not e(open,T+1,P),
not e(locked,T+1,P).
pc(closed,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(locked),T+1,P),
not holds(closed,T,P),
not e(open,T+1,P),
not e(locked,T+1,P).
holds(neg(locked),T1,P) :-
holds(open,T1,P).
e(neg(locked),T+1,P) :-
e(open,T+1,P).
pc(neg(locked),T+1,P) :-
pc(open,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(locked),T,P),
not e(neg(open),T+1,P).
holds(neg(locked),T1,P) :-
holds(closed,T1,P).
e(neg(locked),T+1,P) :-
e(closed,T+1,P).
pc(neg(locked),T+1,P) :-
pc(closed,T+1,P),
not holds(neg(locked),T,P),
not e(neg(closed),T+1,P).
holds(locked,T1,P) :-
holds(neg(open),T1,P),
holds(neg(closed),T1,P).
e(locked,T+1,P) :-
e(neg(open),T+1,P),
e(neg(closed),T+1,P).
pc(locked,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(open),T+1,P),
not holds(locked,T,P),
not e(open,T+1,P),
not e(closed,T+1,P).
pc(locked,T+1,P) :-
pc(neg(closed),T+1,P),
not holds(locked,T,P),
not e(open,T+1,P),
not e(closed,T+1,P).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% GOAL REPRESENTATION
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
goal(T1,P) :-
holds(locked,T1,P).
goal(T1,P) :-
contrary(L,L1),
holds(L,T1,P),
holds(L1,T1,P).
:- used(h+1,P),
not goal(h+1,P).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% DOMAIN INDEPENDENT RULES
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Rules encoding the effects of non-sensing actions
holds(L,T+1,P) :-
e(L,T+1,P).
holds(L,T+1,P) :-
holds(L,T,P),
contrary(L,L1),
not pc(L1,T+1,P).
% Inertial rules for sensing actions
% Cannot branch to the same path
:- P1 < P2,
P2 < P,
br(G1,T,P1,P),
br(G2,T,P2,P).
:- G1 != G2,
P1 <= P,
br(G1,T,P1,P),
br(G2,T,P1,P).
:- P1 < P,
br(G,T,P1,P),
used(T,P).
used(T+1,P) :-
P1 < P,
br(G,T,P1,P).
holds(G,T+1,P) :-
P1 <= P,
br(G,T,P1,P).
holds(L,T+1,P) :-
P1 < P,
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br(G,T,P1,P),
holds(L,T,P1).
% Rules for generating action occurrences
1{occ(X,T,P):action(X)}1 :-
used(T,P),
not goal(T,P).
:- occ(A,T,P),
not poss(A,T,P).
% Auxiliary Rules
literal(F).
literal(neg(F)).
contrary(F,neg(F)).
contrary(neg(F),F).
new_br(P,P1) :-
P <= P1.
used(1,1).
used(T+1,P) :-
used(T,P).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% HIDE/SHOW ATOMS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
hide.
show occ(A,T,P).
show br(G,T,P,P1).
Smodels Output
$ lparse -c h=2 -c w=3 examples/ex2.smo | smodels
smodels version 2.28. Reading...done
Answer: 1
Stable Model:
br(open,1,1,2) occ(check,1,1) br(closed,1,1,1)
br(locked,1,1,3) occ(flip_lock,2,1)
True
Duration: 0.020
Number of choice points: 2
Number of wrong choices: 0
Number of atoms: 313
Number of rules: 893
Number of picked atoms: 257
Number of forced atoms: 31
Number of truth assignments: 4052
Size of searchspace (removed): 12 (65)
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Cmodels Output
$ lparse -c h=2 -c w=3 examples/ex2.smo | cmodels
cmodels
cmodels version 3.01 Reading...done
Program is not tight.
Calling SAT solver mChaff...
Answer: 1
Answer set: br(open,1,1,3) occ(check,1,1) br(closed,1,1,1)
br(locked,1,1,2) occ(flip_lock,2,1)
Number of Loop Formulas 6
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